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The article provides an in-depth analysis of the contract issues peculiar to
automated electronic commerce. The aim of the study is to provide a critical
evaluation of the various solutions that might be adopted by a legislature seeking
to cure formal defects in agreements that are negotiated and entered into by
software programs, independent of human review. The author begins with an
examination of the current state of the technology that automates electronic
commerce, offering some speculation as to its future development. He then
outlines the barriers to automated electronic commerce inherent in traditional
contract doctrine. He argues against the proposal to cure doctrinal difficulties by
deeming electronic devices to be legal persons and investigates the merit of the
legislative approaches adopted by UNCITRAL, the National Conference of
Commissioners of Uniform State Laws (U.S.), and the Uniform Law Conference
of Canada. He ends by advocating an alternative approach, based on the law of
agency.
Cet article analyse en profondeurles questions de droitcontractuelsoulev6es par
le commerce 6lectronique automatique. L 'dtude a pourbut d'6valuerles diverses
solutions que peut adopter une assemblee legislative d6sirant remddier aux
lacunes formelles des accords n6gocids et conclus par des programmes
informatiques sans intervention humaine. L'auteur commence par examiner
1'6tatactuel de la technologie quipermetd'automatiserle commerce electronique
et formule quelques predictions quant j son d6veloppement futur. II souligne
ensuite les obstacles au commerce 6lectronique automatique inh6rents a la
doctrine traditionnelle du droit contractuel. II s'inscrit contre I'ide de combler les
lacunes de la doctrine en attribuant aux dispositifs electroniques le statut de
personnes morales et explore les m6rites des approches Idgislatives adopt~es
par UNCITRAL, la National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws
(E. -U.), et la Confdrence sur I'uniformisation des lois du Canada. II termine en
prdconisant une approche alternative, bas6e sur le droit du mandat.
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Introduction
The Internet has exceeded most people's expectations in terms of its role
as a new forum for communications and commerce. Despite the fact that
most entrepreneurs of the new economy fancy the idea of sky rockets in
flight, the exponential growth of online interaction poses a serious threat
to the future success of electronic commerce. Many computer and
information scientists are concerned that the Internet is becoming too big,
too fast. With the advent of secure encryption, the increasing acceptance
of electronic currency and many government sponsored incentives,
various stakeholders, including manufacturers, suppliers, wholesalers,
merchants and consumers, have demonstrated a remarkable interest in
doing business online. However, as the Internet continues to increase in
popularity in the business sector, it becomes more and more unwieldy.
Sorting through the mountains of consumer and corporate information,
the inestimable valleys of product lines and the sea of available services
has become an unmanageable, almost impossible task.
The diversity of the Internet, not to mention its perceived ubiquity,
pushes the boundaries of human comprehension, making the online
world an increasingly difficult place for most folks to visit and interact.
Here is how two computer scientists describe it:
Put simply, the sheer volume of information available to us via the Internet
and World Wide Web (WWW) represents a very real problem. The
potential of this resource is immediately apparent to anyone with more
than the most superficial experience of using the WWW. But the reality is
often disappointing. There are many reasons for this. Both human factors
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(such as users getting bored or distracted) and organizational factors (such
as poorly organized pages with no semantic markup) conspire against
users attempting to use the resource in a systematic way....
One important contributing factor to information overload is almost
certainly that an end user is required to constantly direct the management
process. But there is in principle no reason why such searches should not
be carried out by agents, acting autonomously to search the Web on behalf
of some user.
The "agents" referred to by the authors in the above passage are not
human agents, but are in fact electronic devices. Often referred to in the
computer science and business literature as "intelligent software agents,' 2
these electronic devices are thought by many to be a promising solution
to the current threat of "information overkill."3 As one author has
recently predicted,
[a]gents will be a highly necessary tool in the process of information
supply and demand. However, agents will not be able to replace skilled
human information intermediaries. In the forthcoming years their role will
be that of a valuable personal assistant that can support all kinds of people
with their information activities.4
One obvious application for agent technology is electronic commerce.
Commerce is an information intensive activity. Traditionally, the infor-
mational transactions required for engaging in commerce have been
driven mostly by human interaction. Typical interactions include: a
determination of unmet business or consumer needs (need identifica-
tion), the retrieval of information about what to purchase in order to fulfill
those needs (product brokering), an evaluation of merchant-specific
information in order to determine whom to buy needed products from
(merchant brokering), a method of determining the terms and conditions
for the purchase or sale of products (negotiation), and a determination of
1. N.R. Jennings & M. Wooldridge, "Applications of Intelligent Agents" inAgent Technology
(Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 1998) 3 at 13.
2. Or "autonomous agents" or "mobile agents" or some other permutation of these phrases.
Up until recently, the legal literature has tended to avoid this terminology so as not to confuse
these agents with the common law notion of agency. Consequently software agents are
sometimes referred to in the legal literature as "electronic devices." Canadian and American
drafters of electronic commerce legislation have recently given up on this and have adopted the
phrase "electronic agents," which has been described in the Reporter's Notes of the Uniform
Electronic Transactions Act, infra note 12 as a "near term of art."
3. See, e.g., P. Maes, "Agents that Reduce Work and Information Overload" (1994) 37:7
Communications of the ACM 30; B. Hermans, Intelligent Software Agents on the Internet: An
Inventory of Currently Offered Functionality in the Information Society and a Prediction of
(Near-)Future Developments (Ph.D. Thesis, Tilburg University 1996), (1997) 2:3 First
Monday, online: <http://www.hermans.org/agents/> (last modified: 3 March 1997).
4. Hermans, ibid. c.1.
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the perceived level of the quality and service of the products purchased
(customer satisfaction).5 However, as commercial enterprise migrates
further into electronic environments, it is unlikely that all of these
interactions will continue to be carried out exclusively by humans.6
Intelligent software agents will be employed to assist people in the
elimination of many of these time consuming activities and will thereby
reduce transaction costs.
For example, recent innovation in the field of artificial intelligence
makes it possible for electronic devices to interact, exchange information
and engage in operations that from all outward appearances look much
like the negotiation and creation of contractual agreements.7 These
interactions can be distinguished from an earlier generation of automated
transactions in which computer networks were merely the electronic
conduit for human trading. The newer technology makes it possible for
computers to initiate and complete a transaction autonomously, i.e.,
without human intervention. In fact, the entire point of the new technol-
ogy is to allow such transactions to take place without any need for human
traders to review or even be aware of particular transactions.8 Such
innovation is revolutionary. It transforms the role of computer hardware
and software in electronic commerce from that of a passive pipeline to
that of an animated associate.
How the law responds to such innovation will have an important effect
on the future development and growth of electronic commerce. In order
to fully enjoy the benefits of automation, human and corporate traders
need to be confident that the transactions generated by and through their
computers are legally enforceable. This need notwithstanding, it is quite
clear that the involvement of an autonomous computer or mobile com-
puter program in the contract formation process, especially in an online
5. K. Runyon & D. Stewart, Consumer Behaviour, 3rd ed. (Merrill Publishing, 1987); J. Engel
& R. Blackwell, Consumer Behaviour, 4th ed. (CBS College Publishing, 1982).
6. I. Terpsidis et al., "The Potential of Electronic Commerce in Re-Engineering Consumer-
Retail Relationships Through Intelligent Agents" in J.-Y. Roger, B. Stanford-Smith, & P.
Kidd, eds., Advances in Information Technologies: The Business Challenge (IOS Press, 1997).
7. See, e.g., A. Chavez, et al., "A Real-Life Experiment in Creating an Agent Marketplace"
(Proceedings of the Second International Conference on the Practical Application of Intelligent
Agents and Multi-Agent Technology (PAAM'97), London, UK, April 1997), online: MIT
Media Laboratory <http://ecommerce.media.mit.edu/papers/paam97.pdf> (last modified: 25
March 1998).
8. Maes, supra note 3.
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environment, generates considerable doctrinal difficulties.9 Although
these devices are generally referred to as "software agents," they are not
contracting agents in the traditional legal or commercial sense. This is
because electronic devices are not legal persons.
In addition to their want of legal status, electronic devices currently
lack the legal capacity to enter into contracts. Notwithstanding recent
advances in intelligent agent technology, these devices are unable to form
the requisite intention to enter into legal relations. Consequently, whether
one contemplates future automated transactions as between two elec-
tronic devices or between one electronic device and a human individual
or corporation, it is difficult to conceive of any such transaction as
achieving the fundamental traditional prerequisite to contract formation,
viz. the parties' formation of a meeting of the minds.
In keeping with the spirit underlying the UNCITRAL Model Law on
Electronic Commerce,'0 this article is meant to provide an in-depth
analysis of the contract formation issues peculiar to automated electronic
commerce. The central aim of this article is to provide a critical evaluation
of the various possible solutions that might be adopted by a legislator
seeking to cure formal defects in agreements negotiated and entered into
by one or more intelligent software agents. Part I of this article includes
a description of the essential aspects of current agent technology and
surveys the technological and commercial promise of autonomous elec-
tronic devices. In Part II, the barriers to automated electronic commerce
are highlighted via a brief examination of the relevant traditional contract
doctrine. Part III canvasses the recent academic interest in attempting to
cure the doctrinal difficulties raised in Part II by treating electronic
devices as independent legal persons. In Part IV, the approaches currently
9. See, e.g., L. Davies, "Contract Formation on the Internet: Shattering a Few Myths" in L.
Edwards & C. Waelde, eds., Law & The Internet (Oxford: Oxford-Hart Publishing, 1997) 97;
T. Allen & R. Widdison, "Can Computers Make Contracts?"(1996) 9 Harv. J. Law & Tech.
25; C. Karnow, "Liability For Distributed Artificial Intelligences"(1996) 11 Berkeley Tech. L.
J. 147.
10. Model Law on Electronic Commerce, GA Res. 51/162, UN GAOR, 51st Sess., UN Doc.
A/51/628, (1997) at IA6 [hereinafter ModelLaw], online: UNCITRAL <http://www.uncitral.org/
english/texts/electcom/ml-ec.htm> (last modified: 29 January 1999). The spirit underlying the
Model Law is exemplified by the following passage from its "Guide To Enactment":
The objectives of the Model Law, which include enabling or facilitating the use of
electronic commerce and providing equal treatment to users of paper-based documen-
tation and to users of computer-based information, are essential for fostering economy
and efficiency in international trade. By incorporating the procedures prescribed in the
Model Law in its national legislation for those situations where parties opt to use
electronic means of communication, an enacting State would create a media-neutral
environment.
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adopted by the Model Law, " UETA, I2 UECA I3 and UCITAI4 are inves-
tigated in detail. 5 Each of the relevant provisions of these proposed
pieces of legislation posits in its own way the general rule that automated
electronic devices are treated merely as an extension of human and
corporate interactions. The analysis in Part IV aims to uncover the profits
and pitfalls of each of the particular approaches in order to determine
whether any provisions currently lacking in the proposed legislation are
needed to accompany such a general rule. In Part V, a different approach
is offered. The attempt in Part V is to take seriously the agency metaphor
in order to determine whether the law of agency has anything useful to
contribute to the question about how to treat autonomous electronic
devices in electronic commerce. Part VI provides a brief summary of each
of the issues canvassed.
I. The Technological Promise of Autonomous Electronic Devices
1. What Is An Intelligent Software Agent?
To begin simply, "an agent is a software thing that knows how to do things
that you could probably do yourself if you had time."16 Besides carrying
out tasks on behalf of some information user, what distinguishes software
agents from other computer programs is that an agent is said to perform
such tasks autonomously, i.e., without oversight or intervention. Besides
autonomy, other properties characteristic of software agents include:' 7
11. Ibid.
12. Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (draft approved at July 1999 annual conference)
[hereinafter UETA], online: National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws
<http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uecicta/uetast84.htm> (last modified: 26 October 1999).
13. Uniform Electronic Commerce Act (draft August 1999) [hereinafter UECA], online:
Uniform Law Conference of Canada <http://www.law.ualberta.ca/alri/ulc/current/euecafa.htm>
(last modified: 23 November 1999).
14. Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (draft approved at July 1999 annual
conference) [hereinafter UCITA], online: Uniform Law Commissioners <http://
www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/citalOst.htm> (last modified: 25 October, 1999).
15. Other proposed and enacted legislation are considered in lesser detail.
16. T. Selker cited in P. Jancar, "Pragmatic Application of Information Agents" in BIS
Strategic Decisions (Norwell, 1995)
17. See e.g., Hermans, supra note 3; Jennings & Wooldridge, supra note I at 4-5; M.R.
Genesereth & S.P. Ketchpel, "Software Agents"(1994) 37:7 Communications of the ACM 48;
J.E. White, "Mobile Agents White Paper" (1997-1998), online: General Magic <http://
www.genmagic.com/technology/techwhitepaper.html> (last modified: 18 September 1998);
J.S. Rosenschein & M.R. Genesereth, "Deals Among Rational Agents" in A.K. Joshi, ed.,
IJCAI 1985 : Proceedings of the Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelli-
gence, Los Angeles, CA (Morgan Kaufmann, 1985).
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" social ability (the capacity to interact with other soft-
ware agents or with human beings
through a shared language)
" mobility (the ability to move around an electronic
environment)
• temporal continuity (the ability to run a process continuously
in an active or passive mode rather than
merely performing a once-only compu-
tation)
* reactivity (the ability to perceive an environment and
respond to changes that occur within it)
• proactivity (the ability to initiate goal-directed
behaviour)
" goal orientedness (the ability to handle complex, high level
tasks by performing operations that break
down tasks into smaller sub-tasks and
then prioritize the order in which these
tasks will be accomplished)
* adaptivity (the ability to adjust to the habits, work-
ing methods and preferences of a user)
In the current literature, agenthood is often measured along two axes:
agency and intelligence. 8 In this context, the concept of agency refers to
the degree of authority and autonomy given to an electronic device as it
interacts with its user and with other electronic devices in an environ-
ment. 19 The concept of intelligence in this context refers to
the degree of reasoning and learned behaviour: the agent's ability to accept
the user's statement of goals and carry out the task delegated to it. At a
minimum, there can be some statement of preferences, perhaps in the form
of rules, with an inference engine or some other reasoning mechanism to
act on these preferences. Higher levels of intelligence include a user model
or some other form of understanding and reasoning about what a user
wants done, and planning the means to achieve this goal. Further out on the
intelligence scale are systems that learn and adapt to their environment, both
in terms of the user's objectives, and in terms of the resources available to
the agent. Such a system might, like a human assistant, discover new
relationships, connections, or concepts independently from the human user,
and exploit these in anticipating and satisfying user needs.2"
18. P. Fingar, "A CEO's Guide to eCommerce Using Object-Oriented Intelligent Agent
Technology" (June 1998) at 20, online: <http://homel.gte.net/pfingar/eba.htm> (last modi-
fied: 30 November 1998).
19. Ibid.
20. A. Gilbert et al., "The Role of Intelligent Agents in the Information Infrastructure" (1995)
[unpublished] cited by Hermans, supra note 3 at c. 2, online: <http://activist.gpl.ibm.com:81/
WhitePaper/ptc2.htm>.
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One of the early prototypes out of the MIT Media Lab that exemplifies
a number of the properties characteristic of intelligent agents was a
software program called Maxim.2' Described as a "personal digital
assistant," this software exploits agent technology in order to manage and
filter email. The program can "learn to prioritize, delete, forward, sort,
and archive mail messages on behalf of a user" by "looking over the
shoulder"2 2 of a user as he or she works with his or her email and by
making internal predictions about what a user will do with the email.
Once Maxim achieves a particular level of accuracy in its predictions, it
commences offering suggestions to the user about how best to handle the
email.
Around the same time that Maxim was being developed, Maes et al.
also designed an Internet news filtering program known as Newt. After
a human user provides Newt with a series of examples of news articles
that would and would not be of interest, this information-specific feed-
back is utilized by Newt to develop an internal model of the user's
preferences, which is ultimately employed by Newt to filter and thereby
select those items of news that would be of interest, without any need for
the human user to browse the items. Newt is also capable of retrieving
articles on the basis of explicit rules as provided by the user.23
2. Recent Applications of Intelligent Software Agents in Electronic
Commerce
24
More recent developments at the MIT Media Lab and elsewhere have
shifted away from automating pure information management systems in
favour of agent technology aimed specifically at furthering electronic
commerce. PersonaLogic, for example, is a tool that assists consumers in
determining what to buy (product brokering) by guiding them through a
large product feature space. 25 This is accomplished by allowing consum-
ers to specify constraints on a product's features. A constraint satisfaction
search engine then returns an ordered list of -only those products that
satisfy all the consumer's chosen preferences. A similar product, known
as Firefly, helps consumers find products. 26 But instead of filtering on the
21. Maes, supra note 3.
22. Ibid. at 35.
23. Ibid.
24. It should be noted that intelligent agent technology has a number of other commercial and
industrial applications including: information management, business process management,
healthcare management, patient monitoring, gaming technologies, interactive theater, product
manufacturing, air traffic control, etc. See Jennings & Wooldridge, supra note 1 at 11-17 and
Hermans, supra note 3 at 19-27.
25. PersonaLogic URL: <http://www.personalogic.com/>.
26. Firefly URL: <http://www.firefly.com> (date accessed: 28 March 1999).
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basis of product features, Firefly recommends products via a word of
mouth recommendation mechanism called automated collaborative fil-
tering (ACF).27 "Essentially, Firefly uses the opinions of like-minded
people to offer consumer recommendations. The system is currently
being used to recommend commodity products such as music and
books."28
Other shopping agents have been developed that make comparisons
not on the basis of products but by comparing merchant alternatives
(merchant brokering). The first agent of this kind, developed by Andersen
Consulting, is known as BargainFinder.2 9 When a user provides the name
of a particular product, e.g., the CD titled: Dave Mathews Band -Live at
Red Rocks, BargainFinder is able to search a number of merchant Web
sites and determine and compare various price differentials. More recent
agents, such as Jango,30 have been developed in order to correct certain
limitations found in the earlier versions of merchant brokering agents.3
Other agents exploit different mechanisms for merchant brokering.
Instead of surfing the Web for the best advertised prices, the University
of Michigan's AuctionBot allows buyers and sellers to congregate in the
same virtual space and participate in personalized auctions that are
created by sellers who are allowed to specify parameters such as clearing
times, methods for resolving bidding ties, etc.32 One of the features said
to distinguish AuctionBot from a number of other auction sites is that it
provides an "application programmable interface" that enables users to
create their own software agents to autonomously compete in the
27. See U. Shardanand & P. Maes, "Social Information Filtering: Algoithms for Automating
'Word of Mouth"in I.R. Katz et al., eds., CHI 1995: Proceedings of the Computer-Human
Interaction Conference, Denver, Co. (ACM/Addison-Wesley, 1995).
28. R. Guttman , A.G. Moukas & P. Maes, "Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: A
Survey" (1998) 13 The Knowledge Engineering Review 147, online: MIT Media Laboratory
<http://ecommerce.media.mit.edu/papers/ker98.pdf> at 3.
29. BargainFinder URL: <http://bf.cstar.ac.com/bf7>.
30. Jango URL: <http://www.jango.com/>.
31. See R. Doorenbos, 0. Etzioni & D. Weld, "A Scalable Comparison-Shopping Agent for
the World Wide Web" in Agents 1997: Proceedings ofthe First International Conference on
Autonomous Agents, Marina Del Rey, C.A. (New York: ACM Press, 1997).
32. AuctionBotURL: <http://auction.eecs.umich.edu/>. See also P.R. Wurman, M.P. Wellman
& W.E. Walsh, "The Michigan Internet AuctionBot: A Configurable Auction Server for
Human and Software Agents" in K.P. Sycara, M. Wooldidge eds., Proceedings of the Second
International Conference on Autonomous Agents, St. Paul Minneapolis, USA (New York:
ACM Press, 1998), online: Association for Computing <http://www.acm.org/pubs/citations/
proceedings/ai/280765/p301 -wurman/> (last modified: 29 June 1999).
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AuctionBot marketplace.33 By virtue of this feature, human users need
not invest time in the actual bidding process, which often lasts for several
hours or, in some cases, several days.
One of the more promising recent developments in agent technology
related to merchant brokering is the MIT Media Lab's Kasbah.34 This
system is described as an "online, multi-agent classified ad system":
A user wanting to buy or sell goods creates an agent, gives it some strategic
direction, and sends it off into a centralized agent marketplace. Kasbah
agents proactively seek out potential buyers or sellers and negotiate with
them on behalf of their owners. Each agent's goal is to complete an
acceptable deal, subject to a set of user-specified constraints such as a
desired price, a highest (or lowest) acceptable price, and the date by which
to complete the transaction. The latest version of Kasbah incorporates a
distributed trust and reputation mechanism called the Better Business
Bureau. Upon the completion of a transaction, both parties may rate how
well the other party managed their half of the deal (e.g., accuracy of
product condition, completion of transaction, etc.). Agents can then use
these ratings to determine if they should negotiate with agents whose
owners fall below a user specified threshold....
Negotiation in Kasbah is straightforward. After buying agents and selling
agents are matched, the only valid action in the negotiation protocol is for
buying agents to offer a bid to selling agents with no restrictions on time
or price. Selling agents respond with either a binding "yes" or "no".
Given this protocol, Kasbah provides buyers with one of three negotiation
"strategies": anxious, cool-headed, and frugal - corresponding to a linear,
quadratic, or exponential function respectively for increasing its bid for a
product over time. The simplicity of these negotiation heuristics makes it
intuitive for users to understand what their agents are doing in the
marketplace.35
As indicated in the above passage, Kasbah not only facilitates human
users in the merchant brokering phase of electronic commerce but in the
negotiation process as well. "Agent communication is based on a request-
response protocol and is strictly agent-to-agent. There is no broadcast of
messages and a third party agent cannot eavesdrop on a transaction taking
place between two other agents."36 When an agent (buying or selling)
completes a transaction, a notification is sent to the user who created the
agent. In a recent real-life experiment held at the MIT Media Lab, the
notification messages were delivered to human users by pagers. Of
33. See Guttman et al., supra note 28 at 4.
34. Kasbah URL: <http://kasbah.media.mit.edul>.
35. See Guttman et al., supra note 28 at 3,4.
36. Supra note 7 at 7.
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course, there are other possibilities. Once the agent completes the deal, it
ceases to negotiate with other agents and automatically asks the market-
place (a closed system) to remove it from the list of "active" agents.
Among other things, this ensures that other agents will not be able to send
it messages. According to the rules of engagement built into the design
of the closed system, it is then up to the human users to "physically
consummate" the transaction.3 7
One last example of the recent innovation in agent technology relevant
to electronic commerce is Tete-a-Tete (T@T).38 The feature that distin-
guishes this agent technology from its predecessors is that T@T negoti-
ates in a cooperative rather than competitive style.39 T@T can also
negotiate across multiple terms of a transaction including "warranties,
delivery times, service contracts, return policies, loan options, gift
services, and other merchant value-added services. 40
3. Future Applications of Intelligent Software Agents in Electronic
Commerce
[I]t is often impossible to identify the effects of a technology. Consider the
now ubiquitous computer. In the mid-1940s, when the digital computers
were first built, leading pioneers presumed that the entire country might
need only a dozen or so. In the mid-1970s, few expected that within a
decade the PC would become the most essential occupational tool in the
world. Even fewer people realized that the PC was not a stand-alone
technology, but the hub of a complex technological system that contained
elements as diverse as on-line publishing, e-mail, computer games and
electronic gambling.4'
It is unclear whether agent technology will appear in electronic com-
merce as part of an evolutionary or revolutionary process. 42 As Hermans
and others have pointed out,43 much will depend on the future infrastruc-
37. Ibid. At the time of the original real-life experiment, the "Better Business Bureau"
mechanism was not yet part of the system design. Consequently, the so-called "ratification"of
agent-mediated transactions was left to the bona fides of their human users without the
imposition of external norms.
38. T@T URL: <http://ecommerce.media.mit.edu/tete-a-tete/>. And see now <http://
www.frictionless.com> (last modified: 19 February 2000).
39. Like Kasbah, described above, this negotiation takes the form of multi-agent, bilateral
bargaining. But instead of using simple raise or decay functions, Tete-a-Tete follows what has
been characterized as an "argumentative" style of negotiations. See e.g., S. Parsons, C. Sierra
& N.R. Jennings, "Agents that Reason and Negotiate by Arguing" (1998) 8 Journal of Logic
and Computation 261.
40. R. Guttman & P. Maes, "Agent-Mediated Integrative Negotiation for Retail Electronic
Commerce"(Proceedings of the Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Trading (AMET'98),
Minneapolis, Minnesota: May, 1998), online: MIT Media Laboratory <http://
ecommerce.media.mit.edu/papers/amet98.pdf> (last modified: 25 March 1999).
41. G. P. Zachary, Cyber-Seers: Through a Glass, Darkly cited by Hermans, supra note 3 atc. 6.
42. See Hermans, supra note 3 at c.6.
43. Supra note 3.
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ture and architecture of the Internet, including the chosen agent stan-
dards,' whether a homogeneous45 or heterogeneous 46 architecture is
adopted, whether interoperability standards will be required 47 etc. The
extent to which agent technology will require an interoperability standard
exemplifies but one of the many difficult choices faced by the developers
of agent technology. Currently, there is much debate over the appropriate
agent paradigm in electronic commerce: should its negotiation protocol
be competitive or cooperative in nature? 48 Guttman et al. have recently
rebuffed the use of competitive protocols in retail markets from eco-
nomic, game theoretic, and business perspectives. 49 Because merchants
tend to strive for highly cooperative, long-term relationships with their
customers in order to maximize loyalty, customer satisfaction and repu-
tation, Guttman et al. recommend more cooperative multi-agent decision
analysis tools instead of competitive negotiation protocols such as online
auctions. If this approach becomes the norm - which presently appears to
be the case - an interoperability standard will indeed be necessary.
If it turns out that open standards are further developed and adopted,
one might expect that electronic commerce will shift away from its
current mode of interaction - a mode which is in many ways constrained
by the fact that transactions take place within a closed system (e.g., MIT's
Kasbah)5 0 In the future, there will likely be a move towards more open,
"public" systems. This will require much greater agent mobility." In the
open marketplaces of the future, the specific negotiation protocols will
likely not be predetermined These negotiation protocols would be left to
the predilections of those who design, create and employ the intelligent
agents involved in particular transactions.
44. E.g., will Agent Communication Language [ACL] used in conjunction with Knowledge
Interchange Format [KIF] and Knowledge Query and Manipulation Language [KQML]
remain the standard?
45. I.e., a single, all-encompassing system which handles all transactions and functions.
46. I.e., a series of separate systems within which certain kinds of agents interact with other
agents of the same kind.
47. I.e., a standard that enables an intelligent agent to engage in cooperative activities with
other agents such as information searches. The Firefly technology described supra, note 26
operates on a cooperative paradigm.
48. See generally J.S. Rosenschein & G. Zlotkin, Rules of Encounter. Designing Conven-
tionsfor Automated Negotiation Among Computers (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994).
49. R. Guttman & P. Maes, "Cooperative vs. Competitive Multi-Agent Negotiations in Retail
Electronic Commerce" in M. Klusch & G. Weib, eds., CIA 1998: Cooperative Information
Agents II, Paris, France (Springer, 1998), online: MIT Media Laboratory <http://
ecommerce.media.mit.edu/papers/cia98.pdf> (last modified: 25 March 1999).
50. To partake in Kasbah, one must be registered as a member of the system.
51. J. E.White "Mobile Agents" in J.M. Bradshaw, ed., Software Agents (Menlo Park, Calif.:
AAAI Press; Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997).
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The future shift towards more open systems will have a significant
impact on the legal treatment of automated electronic commerce. The
current closed systems have the commercial advantage of clarifying all
of legal rules in advance. Recall, for example, that the gateway to
Kasbah's marketplace requires human users to adopt certain predeter-
mined rules of engagement, many of which were built directly into the
system. 2 In the open systems of the future - where intelligent agents will
be free to roam the Net in search of transaction partners without any pre-
existing commitment to the same rules of engagement as those preferred
by agents encountered along the way - the threat of commercial uncer-
tainty looms large. Unlike the original Kasbah marketplace, where the
agents were purposely constrained to extremely simplistic negotiations
in order to foster trust and confidence in the human users, consider the
kind of legal clarification that might be required in the following future
world:
Mary relies on a mobile agent to orchestrate her Friday evenings. Born
months ago, the agent waits in a quiet corner of the electronic marketplace
for most of the week; each Friday at noon it takes the following steps.
1. Mary's agent keeps a record of the films it selected on past occasions to
prevent selecting one of those films again.
2. The agent travels from its place of repose to one of the many video places
in the electronic marketplace. It uses the agent programming language's
go instruction and a ticket that designates the video place by its authority
and class.
3. The agent meets with the video agent that resides in and provides the
service of the video place. It uses the meet instruction and a petition that
designates the video agent by its authority and class.
4. The agent asks the video agent for the catalogue listing for each romantic
comedy in its inventory. The agent selects a film at random from among
the recent comedies, avoiding the films it has selected before, whose
catalog numbers it carries with it. The agent orders the selected film from
the video agent, charges it to Mary's Visa card, and instructs the video
agent to transmit the film to her home at 7 p.m. The video agent compares
the authority of Mary's agent to the name on the Visa card.
5. The agent goes next to the Domino's pizza place. It uses the go
instruction and a ticket that designates the pizza place by its authority and
class.
6. The agent meets with the pizza agent that resides in and provides the
service of the pizza place. It uses the meet instruction and a petition that
designates the pizza agent by its authority and class.
52. See, e.g., Model Interchange Agreement for the International Commercial Use of
Electronic Data Interchange, UN/ECE Rec. 26, TRADE/WP.4/R1l133/Rev. 1, (1995),
online: UNECE <http://www.unece.org/trade/rec/rec26en.htm> (last modified: 20 April 1998).
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7. The agent orders one medium-size pepperoni pizza for home delivery
at 6:45 p.m. The agent charges the pizza, as it did the video, to Mary's Visa
card. The pizza agent, like the video agent before it, compares the authority
of Mary's agent to the name on the agent's Visa card.
8. Mary's agent returns to its designated resting place in the electronic
marketplace. It uses the go instruction and a ticket that designates that
place by its place name and network address, which it noted previously.
All that remains is for the agent to notify Mary and Paul of their evening
appointment. This is accomplished in the following additional steps.
9. The agent creates two new agents of Mary's authority and gives each the
catalogue listing of the selected film and Mary's and Paul's names. Its
work complete, the original agent awaits another Friday.
10. One of the two new agents goes to Mary's mailbox place and the other
goes to Paul's. To do this they use the go instruction and tickets that
designate the mailbox places by their class and authorities.
11. The agents meet with the mailbox agents that reside in and provide the
services of the mailbox places. They use the meet instruction and petitions
designating the mailbox agents by their class and authorities.
12. The agents deliver to the mailbox agents electronic messages that
include the film's catalogue listing and that remind Mary and Paul of their
date. The two agents terminate and the mailbox agents convey the
reminders to Mary and Paul. 3
It does not require much imagination to conceive of adaptations in the
use of this technology which would generate transactions much more
sophisticated than the straightforward consumer purchases envisioned
above. Imagine, for example, a similar agent technology applied by an
industrial manufacturer that, instead of ordering pizza and a video,
supports a team of software agents, each of which is dispatched to
perform a particular task that will be carried out in conjunction with the
tasks performed by other agents on the team. For example, after an agent
designed to monitor the manufacturer's supply of certain sub-compo-
nents discovers that the supply is becoming low, it launches into action
several merchant brokering agents which are then dispatched to search
the Internet for the lowest prices for various sub-components needed to
manufacture the ultimate product. Once the appropriate merchants sites
have been discovered and evaluated, other agents would step in to
negotiate the terms and conditions upon which those separate sub-
components might be purchased (including product warranties, freight
rates, delivery dates, exemption clauses, etc.). Other agents would assist
with the information and communications pertaining to placing the
orders and arranging for the shipping and receiving of the sub-compo-
53. Supra note 51 at 467-69.
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nents, while a different agent would initiate electronic payment schemes.
Still other agents would deal with the marketing and sales of the ultimate
product, once manufactured. Notice that the advent of electronic cash
mechanisms 54 - especially in cases where the goods bought and sold are
information products not requiring a physical medium in order to execute
the transaction - no longer requires human users to ratify or "physically
consummate" agent-made agreements (as was necessarily the case in the
original Kasbah experiment). Thus one ends up in a future world in which
agreements are negotiated and entered into without any need for human
traders to review or even be aware of particular transactions.
There is no doubt that a world such as this might create various
advantages for human entrepreneurs. Such a world would spare human
users from having to find, negotiate, and deal with buyers and sellers. A
truly intelligent technology applied in this manner would depersonalize
the process of negotiation, avoid misunderstandings resulting from
language barriers and perhaps even free people to perform other impor-
tant tasks or pursue more meaningful relationships.55 These systems
would also allow more accurate business records to be kept since software
agents could build databases that, among other things, keep track of all
interactions (whether or not the particular negotiation resulted in the
formation of a contract). Some authors believe that the proper integration
of the information on such databases would not only reduce transaction
costs but would lead to pricing that is closer to optimal.56
Of course, such a world would create disadvantages too.57 As pro-
grammers of intelligent agent technology become more adept, it will
become possible for them to design deceitful and perhaps even malicious
54. P. Panurach, "Money in Electronic Commerce: Digital Cash, Electronic Fund Transfer,
and Ecash" 39:6 Communications of the ACM 45; S. L. Lelieveldt, "How To Regulate
Electronic Cash: An Overview of Regulatory Issues and Strategies" (1997) 24 Amer. Univ.
Law Rev. 1163; R.L. Field, "1996: Survey of the Year's Developments in Electronic Cash Law
and the Laws Affecting Electronic Banking in the United States" (1997) 46 Amer. Univ. Law
Rev. 967; W. Powell, "Ecash: The New Coin of the World" 32:5 CGA Magazine (May 1998)
54; S. Chinoy, "Electronic money in Electronic Purses and Wallets" (1997) 12 B.F.L.R. 15; B.
Crawford, "Is Electronic Money Really Money?" (1997) 12 B.F.L.R. 399.
55. See A. Chavez & P. Maes, "Kasbah: An Agent Marketplace for Buying and Selling
Goods" (Proceedings of the First International Conference on the Practical Application of
Intelligent Agents and Multi-Agent Technology (PAAM'96), London, UK, April 1996),
online: MIT Media Laboratory <http://ecommerce.media.mit.edu/papers/paam96.pdf> (last
modified: 25 March 1999).
56. Ibid.
57. See D. Lloyd, "Frankenstein's Children: Artificial Intelligence and Human Value"
(1985) 16 Metaphilosophy 307; J. H. Moor, "Are There Decisions Computers Should Never
Make?" (1979) 1 Nature & Sys. 217; J. W. Snapper, "Responsibility For Computer Based
Errors" (1985) 16 Metaphilosophy 289.
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agent protocols. Some authors have suggested that there might be
technological solutions to these technological problems: "We might have
regulator agents roaming the marketplace to ensure that no illegal activity
occurs."58 It is difficult at present to know or even imagine whether agent
technology could ever rise to the occasion. Even if such technology
became possible, it is not clear that regulator agents could effectively
operate in the open systems of the future where there would exist an
indeterminate number of potential marketplaces. Nor is it clear that we
would want them to.
Deceit aside, it is also possible for agent technology to malfunction or
in some other way carry out decision processes that do not comport with
the intentions or purposes of the human user who employed the particular
agent or, for that matter, the human designer of the software agent. First,
as Karnow points out, software is by nature unreliable.
The failure of a complex program is not always due to human negligence
in the creation or operation of the program, although examples of such
negligence are legion. But, in addition, there are problems with software
reliability. While it is at least theoretically possible to check to see if a
program output is correct in a given instance, it has not been proven that
programs can be verified as a general matter; that is, that they are correct
over an arbitrary set of inputs. In fact, it appears highly unlikely that even
programs which successfully process selected inputs can be shown to be
correct generally.
Software reliability generally cannot be conclusively established because
digital systems in general implement discontinuous input-to-input map-
pings that are intractable by simple mathematical modeling. This is
particularly important: continuity assumptions can't be used in validating
software, and failures are caused by the occurrence of specific, nonobvious
combinations of events, rather than from excessive levels of some identi-
fiable stress factor.
The long-term operation of complex systems entails a fundamental uncer-
tainty, especially in the context of complex environments, including new
or unpredictable environments. That, of course, is precisely the situation
in which intelligent agents are forecast to operate. 9
Beyond the difficulties inherent in testing and verifying the response of
software before it is put onto the market, it is well understood by
programmers and computer scientists that producing the perfect, error-
free program is a statistically impossible exercise. Software instructions
are propagated through computer system by means of a series of ones and
zeros or "ons" and "offs," with each instruction creating a discrete state
58. Supra note 55 at 6-7.
59. C. Karnow, "Liability for Distributed Artificial Intelligences" (1996) 11 Berkeley Tech.
L. J. 147 at 161-62.
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within the computer. Each new instruction interacts with the instructions
given before, producing new discrete states. With literally millions of
lines of coding and the resulting combinations of instructions, it is
possible to determine that any computer, while processing a piece of
software, can exist in billions or even trillions of completely unique
conditions. It is thus impossible to predict the computer's behaviour in all
situations. In many cases, even if an error is found, a programmer will
decide that its correction could lead to so many new complications that
leaving the error in place and knowing of its existence is better than to
attempt to correct the problem. 60
In addition to unreliability on the part of a software agent, the
intentions of a human user are not always carried out even when the agent
technology is performing reliably. For example, recent software technol-
ogy developed and described by Hofstadter and Mitchell is designed
specifically to handle radical shifts in context and to perform "unpredict-
able but pertinent results."'6' Because mobile agent technology aims to
allow agents to be cross-software compatible, human users often will not
know when or even where their agents are executing. When one software
agent operates in conjunction with others in a cooperative agent system
across platforms and operating systems, as described above, it will
become next to impossible to distinguish between them and determine
60. The following passage from Hecht, Herbert and Myron, "Software Reliability in the
System Context" (1986)12 IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering 51 at 55, offers a
general prediction of the number of faults found in the average piece of software based on an
examination of programs in use:
Number of lines of code: I million
number of faults in the initial software [2 percent of the total, based on a widely reported
average]: 20,000
faults remaining after testing [assuming that 90 percent of the faults are found and
fixed]: 2000
numbers of failures per year [10 percent of the faults, based on experience]: 200
faults corrected after failures: 200
remaining faults: 1800
lines of code added or changed per year routine maintenance [estimated at 10 percent
per year or]: 100,000
number of faults added to system [2 percent of new code]: 2000
number of new faults remaining after debugging new code [assuming 90 percent of new
faults removed]: 200
number of faults not discovered in previous year: 1800
total number of faults: 2000: expected failure rate per year [based on prior failure
assumption]: 200
61. D.R. Hofstadter, Fluid Concepts and Creative Analogies: Computer Models of the
Fundamental Mechanisms of Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1995) at 226.
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which agent did not properly perform its task. As two authors recently
described it,
We envision a world filled with millions of knowledge agents, advisers,
and assistants. The integration between human knowledge agents and
machine agents will be [seamless], often making it difficult to know which
is which.
62
Other authors have made this point somewhat more starkly: "The
biggest danger of any network-wide system that allows intelligent agents
is that some of the agents will deliberately or accidentally run amuck.
Agents have much in common with viruses: Both are little programs that
get to seize control of a foreign machine." 63 Another commonality
between some software agents and viruses is that they will sometimes
mutate in order to perform their tasks. As a result, both are subject to
polymorphism, a phenomenon which makes it difficult to isolate a
particular program since its identity is not always persistent over time.64
Thus, if a particular intelligent agent carries out its function through a
series of continuous mutations of specific bits of its program ("codelets,"
as Hofstadter calls them), it is not long before that agent will become
unrecognizable to the human user who created and employed it.
In addition to the phenomenon of polymorphism, a relatively new form
of programming threatens to obfuscate matters further. "Neural network-
ing" is an approach to software design that models itself after one
conception of the human mind. Rather than tackling a problem through
examination by brute computational force, the computer is instructed to
find relationships between certain data and certain conclusions. The more
often such a relationship is found to be true, the greater weight that
relationship will be given. When faced with similar data later, the
program uses its associations to leapfrog to the correct solution. Though
this approach vastly increases the speed and sophistication of a computer's
response, the software's ability to learn rapidly alters the software beyond
its original parameters. Described as a "lack of transparency," this
phenomenon makes understanding its decision-making process quite
difficult in retrospect. Such a program might eventually develop a better
ability to make predictions about the behaviour of other intelligent agents
than it would about its own.65
62. F. Hayes-Roth & N. Jacobstein, "The State of Knowledge-Based Systems" (1994) 37:3
Communications of the ACM 27 at 35.
63. P. Wayner, "Agents Away" Byte 19:5 ( May 1994) 113 at 116.
64. See Karnow, supra note 59 at 171.
65. G.J. van Opdorp & R.F. Walker, "A Neural Network Approach to Open Texture" in H.
W. K. Kaspersen & A. Oskamp, eds., Amongst Friends in Computer and Law: A Collection
of Essays in Remembrance of Guy Vandenberghe (Deventer: Kluwer Law & Taxation
Publishers, 1990) 279 at 305.
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The future is full of question marks. Although it is by no means clear
precisely what software agents will look like or how they will operate in
the years to come, it is virtually certain that software agents will play a
major role in the next wave of electronic commerce. Agents will no doubt
be employed to assist human interaction through the various stages of a
transaction from product and merchant brokering through to negotiation,
sale, distribution and payment. It is not unreasonable to predict that, in
time, agent technology will become sufficiently sophisticated to perform
many if not all of these sorts of tasks without human oversight or
intervention. Such possibilities would perhaps require programmers to
develop polymorphic systems capable of generating creative intelli-
gence. Some of the decisions entailed by these systems would by nature
be pathological, i.e., at least some of the outcomes generated by future
agents would be unintended. Still, gazing through the window to the
future, the technological and commercial promise of autonomous elec-
tronic devices is immediate and apparent.
Viewing the matter through the legal lens of the here and now, it is
equally obvious that agent-driven commerce will run into doctrinal
difficulties, in particular the formation of contracts. How the law re-
sponds to this technology is likely to have an important effect on the
development and growth of electronic commerce. In order to fully enjoy
the benefits of automation, legislation must include a mechanism that will
adequately cure contractual defects so as to ensure that the transactions
generated by and through computers are legally enforceable. To do so, it
is necessary to examine in greater detail the doctrinal difficulties associ-
ated with automated transactions.
II. Doctrinal Difficulties Associated with Automated
Electronic Commerce
1. Only Legal Persons Can Contract
In order for electronic commerce to skyrocket in the manner predicted by
its enthusiasts, human and corporate traders will need to be sure that
automated transactions are perceived and understood as contractual in
nature. As Fridman and others have pointed out,
Since a contract is an agreement between two or more persons, and
involves the idea of consent, only those who have the power to give
consent can contract.66
66. G.H.L. Fridman, The Law of Contract in Canada, 3rd ed. (Scarborough: Carswell, 1994)
at 138.
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Inextricably tied to the notion of contractual consent is the idea that the
consenting person has signified an intention to be bound by the terms of
the agreement. As Fridman puts it,
[a] contract can only arise if there is the animus contrahendi between the
parties. Without the expressed or implicit intention that a contract should
emerge as a result of the language or conduct of the alleged parties, no
contractual obligations can be said to exist and be capable of enforcement.
Hence the offer that is made must be an offer to contract involving the
creation of legal relations.67
Although the law has extended the scope of juristic personality so as
to create limited rights and obligations for human artifacts such as
corporations, electronic devices are not legal persons. Since they are not
persons, electronic devices do not have the legal power to give consent.
Nor can such devices be said in any meaningful legal sense to form the
necessary animus contrahendi - the intention to create legal relations. Of
course, this does not preclude the possibility that electronic devices might
play an instrumental role in the formation of contracts. For example, an
electronic device might be used to offer for sale a number of products
ranging from candy bars or soda pop to drivers' licenses and insurance
policies. Contracts that arise from such transactions are not generally
analyzed as contracts between a machine and the person who plugs in the
coins, bills or tokens. In these instances, the contractual offer is under-
stood as a unilateral offer made by the human or corporate owner or
operator of that machine. The nature of the offer is the sale of a product
at a stipulated price and the offer is thought to be accepted by the conduct
of the individual who responds to it by depositing the stipulated quidpro
quo into the machine. Although it is true that the human or corporate
offeror will not oversee or even be aware of particular transactions when
utilizing machines of this sort, it is also true that the offeror will always
be said to have intended and consented to the precise terms of the contract
and the quantity of the product available for sale (subject, of course, to any
malfunction or misuse), since machines of this sort are not sufficiently
intelligent or autonomous to alter the terms or generate additional product
without further human interaction.
Thus what distinguishes the electronic transactions contemplated
above in Part I from a purchase through a vending machine is that the
agreements of tomorrow will be generated by the machines, not merely
through them. It is only when electronic devices become sufficiently
animated that doctrinal difficulties begin to arise. Once electronic de-
67. Ibid. at 26.
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vices are able to initiate contractual offers autonomously, there will be
situations where it will be disingenuous and perhaps even conceptually
disadvantageous to characterize those transactions as unilateral offers
made by the human users of those devices. Once electronic devices are
no longer mere conduits for commercial transactions, it will become
necessary to determine how best to treat those devices. Although some
academics have offered the radical suggestion that the electronic devices
of the future be included among the category of legal persons - a
suggestion which will be subject to investigation in Part III below - it is
clear that electronic devices do not currently enjoy the status attributed to
legal persons. Consequently, an autonomous electronic device cannot be
said to be a party to a contract.
2. Contractual Capacity
Even if autonomous electronic devices somehow achieved the status of
persons in law, it is not clear that every such device would be capable of
entering into a contract. As stated by Cheshire and Fifoot, "[i]f all of the
elements of contract exist between two parties, the agreement may
nevertheless lack legal effect if one or both of the parties lack capacity to
contract."68 In other words, prior to giving legal effect to their agree-
ments, the common law has traditionally required of all persons that they
are capable of demonstrating a certain degree of intellectual capacity. To
take a typical example, there exists a well established distinction in law
between the legal treatment of agreements entered into by persons who
are minors and agreements entered into by those said to be of a mature
age. This distinction has had the effect of limiting the extent to which
minors can enter into contracts. A similar rule exists to limit the contrac-
tual capacity for those are said not to be of sound mind. As Fridman puts
it, "[o]nce a person has been found by a court to be wanting in intellect,
then it would seem to follow that such a person lacks contractual capacity.
He or she is not able to consent. '69
Before a determination can be made as to whether it is possible for an
autonomous electronic device to have the legal capacity to contract, it is
important to recognize that the doctrine of contractual capacity serves a
function beyond the determination of who is in fact able to consent to an
agreement. As Waddams has made clear, one of the central reasons
underlying the capacity doctrine is the aim of protecting weaker parties
68. J.G. Starke, N.C. Seddon & M.P. Ellinghaus, eds., Cheshire and Fifoot's Law of
Contract, 6th Australian ed. (Sydney: Butterworths, 1992) at 545.
69. Supra note 66 at 158.
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during the bargaining process.7" According to Waddams, "[flrom the
basic desire to protect minors from exploitation arose a general rule that
minors' contracts were voidable at the minor's option."'" If Waddams is
right to link the issue of contractual capacity to the general desire to
protect weaker parties when entering into agreements, this adds a wrinkle
to the question about whether an electronic device should be said to have
the capacity to contract.7 2 In any event, even the most intelligent and
autonomous of the electronic devices currently utilized in electronic
commerce would seem to lack the capacity to contract.
3. Consensus Ad Idem
The traditional view of contract includes not only an exchange of
promises but also a mutual concordance between the parties as to the
nature and scope of the rights and obligations that coincide with that
exchange of promises.73 That is, the parties must be said to have formed
an agreement with each other. The metaphor which has taken hold
throughout the common law to describe this phenomenon is the idea of
a consensus ad idem - a meeting of the minds. Historically, this metaphor
was based on the paradigm of face-to-face interactions between two
human beings. Bearing in mind this historical point, it is not difficult to
see that automated transactions do not easily fit within this conceptual
framework. In what sense could it be said that electronic devices can
exchange promises, or that two devices can reach a meeting of the minds?
It is essential to recognize that the notion of a consensus ad idem does
not merely signify the mutual concordance between two parties. The
agreement requirement also underscores the voluntary aspect of contract.
After all, the traditional understanding of what makes such an exchange
of promises special, what makes such an agreement binding both in law
and in moral theory, is the underlying idea that the parties to the
agreement have each exercised free will; each person freely chose to
70. S. M. Waddams, The Law of Contracts, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1993) at
447.
71. Ibid.
72. The capacity issue, as conceived by Waddams, would become extremely complicated in
a world where computers are said to have the capacity to contract. Neural net programming,
discussed above in Part I, raises the spectre of vast inequalities between the various competing
electronic devices. Intelligent agent technology is bound to grow in power and sophistication
to the point where the more advanced agents will likely be able to predict the actions and thus
take advantage of older, more obsolete versions. It is also likely that only large corporations
and wealthy individuals will have access to state of the art agent technology. If the law of
contract is to protect weaker parties, it might somehow have to take steps to level the playing
field. Should situations such as this be conceived of as analogous to that of sophisticated parties
contracting with the infirm?
Spirits in the Material World: Intelligent Agents as Intermediaries in Electronic Commerce 213
make representations about the future that created both trust and reliance
in the mind of the other and each person thereby assumed obligations not
otherwise existent in law.74 Aside from a few fairly radical computer
scientists,75 most of us do not presently conceive of electronic devices as
having free will or as capable of making voluntary undertakings meant to
limit future freedom of action.
One potential response to the claim that computers are unable to act
voluntarily and are therefore unable to reach a meeting of the minds is that
the common law has for centuries been premised on an objective theory
of contract. As long ago as 1477, the courts recognized that "the intent of
a man cannot be tried, for the Devil himself knows not the intent of a
man." 76 As Lord Eldon later realized, it must therefore follow that the
proper role of the courts in determining the parties' private obligations is
not "to see that both parties really meant the same precise thing, but only
that both gave their assent to that proposition which, be it what it may, de
facto arises out of the terms of their correspondence. '77 Perhaps the most
famous articulation of the objective theory of contract in the common law
was put forth by Blackburn J. in Smith v. Hughes:
If whatever a man's real intention may be, he so conducts himself that a
reasonable man would believe that he was assenting to the terms proposed
by the other party, and that the other party upon that belief enters into a
contract with him, the man thus conducting himself would be equally
bound as if he had intended to agree to the other party's terms. 78
As Atiyah has argued, this approach can be understood as a manifestation
of the reliance theory of contract.79 To construct the intentions of one
person by determining the reasonable beliefs of another, the courts have
seemed to be less concerned with the fact that someone freely and
73. Supra note 66 at 5.
74. See, e.g., C. Fried, Contract as Promise: a Theory of Contractual Obligation (Cambridge
Mass.:Harvard University Press, 198 1); Fuller & Purdue, "The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages" (1936) 46 Yale L.J. 52. For an exhaustive criticism of this point of view, see P.S.
Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom to Contract (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979); R.K.L.
Collins, ed., The Death of Contract by Grant Gilmore (Columbus: Ohio State University Press,
1995).
75. M. Minsky, "Will Robots Inherit the Earth?" Scientific American 271:4 (October
1994) 108; W. D. May, Edges of Reality: Mind vs. Computer (New York: Insight
Books, 1996); G. Simons, ed., Are Computers Alive? (Boston: Thetford Press, 1983) c. 6; F.
George, Machine Takeover (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1977) at 93-113.
76. Anon (1478), Y.B. 17 Edw IV, Pasch fol. 1, pl. 2.
77. Kennedy v. Lee (1817), 3 Mer 441 at 451; 36 E.R. 170 at 174; [ 1814-23] All E.R. Rep.
181 at 185-6.
78. (1871) L.R. 6 Q.B. 597 at 607.
79. P.S. Atiyah, "Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations" (1978) 94 L.Q. Rev. 193
at 203.
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intentionally chose to bind himself to a particular course of action than
with the fact that the other party reasonably relied on the perception that
he was conducting himself as such.
If Atiyah is right about this, then it might appear as though the actual
internal workings of the electronic device and the question about whether
such a device could ever form an actual intent to enter into an agreement
(rather than merely communicating a representation that there exists
mutual concordance) is unimportant or irrelevant. After all, so long as the
relevant legal determination is simply whether a reasonable person would
believe that the electronic device was assenting to the terms proposed, all
that would seem to matter is the external appearance of an agreement.
This might be correct in so far as the transaction is understood as an
agreement that is merely mediated by one or more electronic devices. In
such case, whatever his real intention may be, the party employing the
electronic device would be conducting himself in such a way that a
reasonable man would believe that he was assenting to the terms pro-
posed by the other party.
But the above analysis is incorrect in circumstances where an offer can
be said to be initiated by the electronic device autonomously, i.e., in a
manner unknown or unpredicted by the party employing the electronic
device. Here it cannot be said that the party employing the electronic
device has conducted himself such that a reasonable person would
believe that he was assenting to the terms proposed by the other party. As
odd as it may seem to us - given our primitive state of agent technology
- there will come a time when an electronic device will appear to conduct
itself such that a reasonable person would believe that the device was
assenting to the terms proposed by the other party. Still, despite the fact
that it is easy to imagine a computer-generated representation causing
reliance in the mind of some unknowing human recipient of that commu-
nication, it remains difficult to grasp how an electronic device, absent any
human interaction, might be said to create undertakings and thereby bind
itself to a representation made about the future in the same way that
people bind themselves when making promises. This yields an important
point. It is crucial to remember that the objective theory of contract will
not allow autonomous electronic devices to escape doctrinal difficulties:
sophisticated technologies notwithstanding, electronic devices are not
legal persons; they lack the intellectual capacity to intend legal relations
and cannot meaningfully be said to enter into agreements voluntarily."
80. Whether we should allow persons to escape from contractual liability when they employ
electronic devices to deceive others by representing a transaction as though it is between two
persons is quite another matter, one that will be further considered under the heading of
Disclosed and Undisclosed Principals in Part V below.
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III. Curing Doctrinal Difficulties by Treating Electronic Devices
as Independent Legal Persons
1. Artificial Persons
One possible means of curing these doctrinal defects would be to deem
autonomous electronic devices to be legal persons and develop a theory
of liability on that basis.8' Although this approach may sound strange to
the uninitiated, it is a well known technique in legal reasoning. As John
Chipman Gray put it:
In books of Law, as in other books, and in common speech, "person" is
often used as meaning human being, but the technical meaning of a
"person" is a subject of legal rights and duties.82
Once the concept of a legal person is understood not as body or soul but
as "a subject of legal rights and duties," one can begin to comprehend the
law's long history of conferring legal personality on several human
artifacts including not only corporations 3 but ships84 and even temples.85
It is by virtue of the legal attribution of rights and duties to such entities
that they become capable of owning property, owing duties of care and
having the capacity to sue or be sued. Some authors, including Gray, have
been critical of the idea of attributing legal personality to such artifacts.
After all, what is the point of making an artifact - which can neither
understand the law nor act upon it - the subject of a legal duty?8 6 This
criticism becomes especially relevant when the so-called "acts" of
complex artificial persons such as corporations are reducible to relations
between human individuals. This critical (though somewhat rhetorical)
observation will serve as a useful point of departure for the ensuing
discussion. Following Gray, it is suggested that the conferral of legal
personality on an artificial entity is justified if and only if there is good
reason to do so.
81. See, e.g., Karnow, supra note 59; L. Wein, "The Responsibility of Intelligent Artifacts:
Toward an Automation Jurisprudence"(1992) 6 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 103; L. Solum, "Legal
Personhood For Artificial Intelligences"(1992) 70 N.C.L. Rev. 1231.
82. J.C.Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law (New York: Macmillan, 1921) at 27.
83. Salomon v. Saloman, [1897] A.C. 22, 66 L.J.Ch.35, 75 L.T. 426, 35 W.R. 193, 41 Sol.
Jo. 63 (Eng. H.L.). See e.g., D. Millon, "Theories of Corporation" (1990) 2 Duke L.J. 201.
84. See supra note 82 at 46-48.
85. Bumper Development Corp. v. Commissioner of Police, [1991] 1 W.L.R. 1362 (C.A.).
86. See supra note 82 at 50-51.
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2. The Justification for Deeming Electronic Devices Legal Persons
There are at least three different kinds of reasons usually offered as
justification for attributing legal personality to an entity: (1) moral
entitlement, (2) social capacity, and (3) legal convenience." The crite-
rion for achieving moral entitlement most often requires that the entity in
question is in some sense conscious or sentient. Although there exists a
substantial literature on the possibility of machine-generated conscious-
ness, 88 a detailed examination of this issue is unnecessary for our present
purposes. Given the current state of agent technology, as Allen and
Widdison have pointed out, "[w]e are concemed with the protection of
those who trade through the computer, rather than the protection of the
computer itself. The computer has no interest in these transactions.
89
When we refer to electronic devices as intelligent agents, we are not
ascribing moral agency to them. The electronic devices contemplated
here are no more moral agents than are our toasters and fridges. As
discussed above, electronic devices are not capable of consenting,
making promises, etc. Even if such devices can be described as intelligent
or as acting autonomously, we are nowhere near the point where these
devices can be said to be making conscious, moral decisions of their own.
The devices are not contracting for themselves. Consequently, they
cannot presently be ascribed legal personality on the basis of moral
entitlement.90
What about ascribing legal personality on the basis of exhibiting a
social capacity? Since at least the time of Turing, many philosophers,
cognitive psychologists and computer scientists have held that the
relevant question is not whether an electronic device exhibits moral
consciousness but whether it could successfully interact with a human
87. See, e.g., T. Allen & R. Widdison, supra note 9 at 35.
88. See, e.g., D.C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 1st ed. (Boston; Toronto: Little,
Brown and Co., 1991) at 33-39; R.S. Jackendoff, Consciousness and the Computational Mind
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987) at 275-327; C. McGinn, The Problem of Consciousness:
Essays Toward a Resolution (Oxford, UK; Cambridge, Mass., USA: B. Blackwell, 1991) at
202-13.
89. See, Allen & Widdison, supra note 9 at 36.
90. Although this does not entail that we cannot attribute responsibility to these devices. See,
e.g., Snapper, supra note 57; W. Bechtel, "Attributing Responsibility to Computer Systems"
(1985) 16 Metaphilosophy 296; Wein, supra note 81.
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questioner so as to convince him or her that it does.9 The focus here is
not on outward appearances simpliciter but, rather, on the manifestation
of social behaviour. Applying Turing's approach to the issue of whether
electronic devices should be considered legal persons for the purposes of
commerce, we would focus on whether the behaviour manifested by such
a device is sufficiently similar to the behaviour manifested by a legal
person who understands that his or her actions may result in the formation
of a contract. According to those who favour this approach, once people
who interact with an electronic device begin to regard it, rather than its
human controllers, as the source of an offer or its acceptance, we might
say that the electronic device has achieved the requisite social capacity to
confer upon it the status of legal person.92 As Allen and Widdison put it:
For example, we are now inclined to say that the most advanced chess
computers play chess on their own; we might also say that autonomous
computers make agreements on their own. In this practical, extra-legal
sense, we attribute the actions to the computer itself. Hence, it makes sense
to think of conferring legal personality on the computer.93
However, the fact that it makes sense to think of conferring legal
personality on the computer by no means implies that doing so would be
a good idea, nor does it entail that we are legally or morally compelled to
do so. As will be discussed in greater detail in Parts IV and V below, there
are conceptual means by which we might understand computer-initiated
agreements as legally binding without any need to personify electronic
devices. If this is correct, the pressing question is whether there would be
any additional value in conferring personality on such devices. In other
words, are there sound commercial reasons for treating electronic devices
as independent legal subjects capable of holding rights and owing duties?
If the future development of agent technology resembles the predic-
tions offered above in Part I, there is at least one reason in favour of
treating electronic devices as independent legal persons under certain
circumstances. Given the polymorphic nature of some electronic devices,
holding liable the human user who created the agent - whether in contract
or in tort - will lead to injustices in situations where the electronic device
puts forth an offer (or accepts an offer) in a manner that no human user
could ever have reasonably foreseen. In such situations, treating the
electronic device as an independent legal person would serve to absolve
of contractual liability the human user who created the device through a
91. A.M. Turing, "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" (1950) 59 Mind 433. See also
J.R. Searle, Minds, Brains and Science (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1984) at
28-41.
92. Allen & Widdison, supra note 9 at 39.
93. Ibid.
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recognition of the fact that some other "person" put forth the offer.
Alternatively, to put it in the language of tort law, the operations of that
device would be seen as a novus actus interveniens.
In this instance, the commercial reason in favour of treating the
electronic device as an independent legal person is that no human has
done anything that specifically resulted in the creation of expectation,
reliance or harm. As Karnow has pointed out, "just as we are not liable for
the consequences of a human agent's unforeseeable pathological actions,
so too humans should be absolved of liability from the unforeseen results
of machine intelligence's pathology. '94 It is important to recognize that
this is not to suggest that human users are not accountable for the
consequences of reasonably foreseeable computer errors. But, according
to Karnow, the "rationale for imposing liability fails when no particular
human has the ability to prevent the injury, short of banning the use of
intelligent agents altogether. 95
Of course, this reason in favour of treating electronic devices as legal
persons must be weighed against competing considerations. One theo-
retical counter-consideration is that legal personality is usually under-
stood as a two-sided coin. If we are to say that electronic devices are
subject to duties (e.g., the duty owed to an offeree upon acceptance of an
agreement unintended by the human creator or, perhaps, the duty owed
to the human creator not to enter into unintended agreements), should we
not also say that electronic devices are owed certain rights? It is odd to
think of a legal person who is subject to legal duties but enjoys no
independent legal rights.96
Even if it could sensibly be said that electronic devices are legal
persons who owe duties, though they are owed no rights, it is not exactly
clear how individuated personality could be ascribed to such devices,
given their polymorphic nature.
In an eternally changing context, agents have no inherent substantiality or
persistence. They are polymorphic. The agents' roles change from cen-
trally active, to sustaining context, to inactive or absent altogether from the
processing environment. 97
94. Karnow, supra note 59 at 189.
95. Ibid. In this respect, the systemic choice to adopt agent technology invokes a cost-benefit
analysis similar to our choice to drive cars: the convenience afforded by both technologies are
adopted in spite of a known risk of harm.
96. Wein considers this possibility, supra note 81. Such a description is reminiscent of
slavery and perhaps the early master-servant relationship, concepts that will be investigated in
Part V below.
97. Karnow, supra note 59 at 191.
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How, then, are we to identify the liable electronic device? "Is it the
hardware? Is it the software? What if the hardware and software are
dispersed over several sites and maintained by different individuals?" 98
It could perhaps be argued that this problem of identification is not
unique to electronic devices. Such problems are also experienced with
corporate entities whose constituents and control mechanisms are also
subject to change over time. As is the case with corporations, one possible
identification procedure involves some form of registry. Thus we might
require of all human traders who want to create electronic devices for use
in electronic commerce that they register an identifiable device name and
some form of digital signature for the device, as well as identify them-
selves as the party standing behind the silicon veil. Karnow proposes one
such system which he refers to as the "Turing Registry":
Just as insurance companies examine and certify candidates for life
insurance, automobile insurance and the like, so too developers seeking
coverage for an agent could submit it to a certification procedure, and if
successful would be quoted a rating depending on the probable risks posed
by the agent. That risk would be assessed along a spectrum of automation:
the higher the intelligence, the higher the risk, and thus the higher the
premium and vice versa. If third parties declined to deal with uncertified
programs the system would become self-fulfilling and self-policing. Sites
should be sufficiently concerned to deal only with certified agents.
Programmers (or others with an interest in using, licensing or selling the
agent) would in effect be required to secure a Turing certification, pay the
premium and thereby secure protection for sites at which their agents are
employed.99
Karnow goes on to describe his version of the registry in detail.
Although his proposed registry procedure is thorough and clearly expli-
cated, what is unclear is why anyone would go to the trouble and expense
of devising and implementing such a system when there exist far less
expensive and less demanding mechanisms of achieving the same result,
i.e., the adoption of a few statutory adjustments to the law of contract.
Since it is not yet known how frequently electronic devices will produce
unintended agreements of consequence,"° it is not clear whether the
98. Allen & Widdison, supra note 9 at 42.
99. Karnow, supra note 59 at 193-94.
100. To be fair to Karnow, his impetus for implementing a registry has more to do with his
concern for issues arising from tort liability (specifically, the difficulties associated with
proving causation in negligence) than with contractual liability. Karnow may be right to think
that there will come a time when a registry is needed to deal with the negligence claims
associated with the malfunction of computer equipment. But that day has not yet arrived. Even
less urgent is the need for such a system to deal with computer malfunctions that generate
unintended agreements.
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added complication and expense that would be required to develop such
a system is justified - especially when one takes into account the fact that
many electronic transactions will be inter-jurisdictional.' ° As well,
unlike a corporate registry, a system which ascribes personality to
electronic devices would not necessarily solve all of the identification
problems since polymorphic devices are continuously evolving.
Given all of these practical uncertainties, as well as the theoretical
problems enumerated above, it seems relatively clear that a cost-benefit
analysis of the legal and economic advantages of an electronic device
registry would lead to the conclusion that the doctrinal difficulties
associated with electronic devices should not be cured by treating them
as independent persons. As at least two critics have pointed out,
it seems superfluous from the business perspective. If traders would go to
the trouble of registering a computer for network use, then why would they
not go through the trouble of signing an interchange or network agreement,
which would serve the same purpose of guaranteeing the enforceability of
agreements?0 2
IV. Curing Doctrinal Difficulties by Treating Electronic Devices as
Extensions of Human or Corporate Interaction
Concluding that it is not advisable to treat electronic devices as indepen-
dent legal persons is consistent with the current approach adopted by the
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, the proposed Uniform
Electronic Transactions Act, the proposed Uniform Computer Informa-
tion Transactions Act, the proposed Uniform Electronic Commerce Act
and other similar legislation. 13 Instead of treating electronic devices as
independent legal persons, the relevant provisions in each of these codes
utilizes a mechanism that attributes the interactions of electronic devices
to the legal persons utilizing those devices. On this style of approach, one
simply disregards the autonomy demonstrated by the electronic device in
the formation of the agreement and pretends that it is nothing more than
a communication tool. This technique has been described by some
101. Imagine the expense associated with an international registry. Who would govern it?
Where and how would disputes be resolved?
102. Allen & Widdison, supra note 9 at 43.
103. Model Law, supra note 10; UETA, supra note 12; UCITA, supra note 14; UECA supra
note 13. See also the Electronic Transactions Act 1999, online: <http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/
html/pasteact/3/3328/top.htm [hereinafter ETA]; Electronic Transactions Act 1998 (enacted
July 1998), online: Government of Singapore_<http://www.cca.gov.sg/eta/index.html>
(last modified: 11 June 1999).
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authors as the adoption of a legal fiction: we pretend that anything issuing
from the computer really issues from its human controller.'04
For example, the "Guide to Enactment" accompanying the UNCITRAL
Model Law states that "[d]ata messages that are generated automatically
by computers without human intervention should be regarded as 'origi-
nating' from the legal entity on behalf of which the computer is oper-
ated." 05 The typical justification for this kind of approach is exemplified
by comments that were made during a meeting of the UETA Drafting
Committee, which underscored "that the key aspect of this term is its
function as a tool of a party."116 The UETA Reporter's Notes go on to say
that
As a general rule, the employer of a tool is responsible for the results
obtained in the use of that tool since the tool has no independent volition
of its own.... This Act (S. 114) provides that a person is responsible for
the actions taken and accomplished through electronic agents in the
absence of human intervention.° 7
According to the annotations accompanying the Canadian UECA, "[t]he
use of the term 'electronic agent' is widespread. The law of agency,
however, plays no part in this discussion. An electronic agent is a tool, not
an agent in law."'18 Similarly, the "Reporter's Notes" in the Uniform
Commercial Code-2B (the precursor to the UCITA) state that the elec-
tronic agent "is in effect a mere extension of the person utilizing it and its
actions constitute the actions of the individual."0 9
The viewpoints expressed in each of the above policy statements have
led to the formulation of attribution rules in each of the respective
proposed statutes.
104. See Allen & Widdison, supra note 9 at 43. For a general discussion of legal fictions see
I.R. Kerr, Legal Fictions (Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Western Ontario t995)
(London, Ont.: Faculty of Graduate Studies, The University of Western Ontario, 1995).
105. See Reporter's Note 35, Model Law, supra note 10.
106. See Reporter's Note under Section 102(5) Electronic Device, UETA (July 24, 1998
Draft), online: National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws <http://
www.law.upenn.edulibrary/ulc/uecicta/98am.htm> (last modified: 24 April 1999).
107. Ibid. (emphasis added).
108. See Comments under Section 19 UECA, supra note 13.
109. See Reporter's Note under Section 202 Uniform Commercial Code-2B (March 10, 1998
Draft), online: National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws <http://
www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ucc2/2b398.htm> (last modified: 23 April 1999).
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1. Attribution Rules in the Proposed and Enacted Legislation
a. The UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce'"0
Among the first bodies to formulate legislation.1 on electronic com-
merce was the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL). This initiative was undertaken partly in response to the
fact that many countries have inadequate or outdated legislation govern-
ing the communication and storage of information. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, it was felt that many countries' existing laws actually impede the
potential growth of electronic commerce by prescribing rules which
impose restrictions on the use of modem media of communication. " 2 The
aim of the Model Law was not simply to enhance global trading by
removing legal barriers such as these, but to do so in a manner that would
result in certainty and uniformity in international trade." 3
Art. 2 of the Model Law sets outs out a number of key definitions.
Although it does not define or even refer to autonomous electronic
devices, it permits such devices to perform operations on an originator's
behalf. An "originator" of a data message is defined as "a person by whom
or on whose behalf" 14 the message was sent. This terminology provides
an implicit recognition of the use of autonomous electronic devices as it
does not limit an intermediary to a "person," while allowing for circum-
stances in which a message might be sent on some person's behalf."5
Indeed, the "Guide to Enactment" states that "[d]ata messages that are
generated automatically by computers without direct human intervention
are intended to be covered by subparagraph (c)."" 6
In art. 13 of the Model Law, not only is the use of such a device
recognized, its operations are attributed to the person using it. According
to the Model Law, a data message is deemed to be the originator's "if it
was sent - (a) by a person who had the authority to act on behalf of the
originator... ; or (b) by an information system programmed by, or on
behalf of the originator to operate automatically."' 11 Thus, the deeming
110. Supra note 10.
11. Strictly speaking, it is incorrect to characterize the code produced by UNCITRAL as
legislation. Rather, it is a Model Law which was drafted to facilitate the development of
uniform legislation to be adopted by member States.
112. Typical examples include the requirement that certain agreements must be "in writing"
or "signed."
113. Supra note 10.
114, Model Law, art. 2, supra note 10 (emphasis added).
115. According to Article 2 of the Model Law, "Intermediary," with respect to a particular
data message, means a person who, on behalf of another person, sends, receives or stores that
data message or provides other services with respect to that data message.
116. Model Law, "Guide to Enactment" at para. 35, supra note 10.
117. Model Law, art. 13, supra note 10 (emphasis added).
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provision in art. 13 attributes to the originator both the acts of traditional
agents, (i.e., persons conferred with the authority to act by some princi-
pal) and the operations of information systems. Although the provision
goes on to assign limits to the circumstances under which an addressee' "8
is entitled to regard a data message as being that of the originator,"19
nowhere in art. 13 or in any of the other provisions are there specified
limitations with regard to the power of an information system to bind the
person on whose behalf the system was operating. In other words,
information systems programmed by or on behalf of the originator to
operate automatically - though they are not meant to be made the subject
of rights and obligations'2° - are treated in precisely the same manner as
persons who have been given the authority to act on the originator's
behalf. That is, they have the power to bind the originator. As stated in its
"Guide to Enactment," "[d]ata messages that are generated automatically
by computers without human intervention should be regarded as 'origi-
nating' from the legal entity on behalf of which the computer is oper-
ated."'21
b. The Proposed Uniform Electronic Transactions Act 22
The UETA, which was recently adopted by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, deals with electronic devices in
a more sophisticated manner than the Model Law by expressly recogniz-
ing that such devices can operate independent of any human review.123
S. 14 of the UETA expressly permits contracts to be formed by
electronic agents. According to the Reporter's Notes in an earlier draft,
"[t]his is in keeping with the purpose of the Act to deal with removing
barriers to electronic transactions while leaving the substantive law, e.g.,
the law of mistake, law of contract formation, unaffected to the greatest
extent possible." 24 S. 14 permits a contract to be formed by the interac-
118. According to Article 2 of the Model Law, the addressee of a data message "means ... the
person to whom the originator's message was dispatched."
119. In essence, these are circumstances in which the addressee complied with an agreed
upon authentication procedure.
120. See the Model Law, "Guide to Enactment" at para. 35, supra note 10.
121. Ibid.
122. UETA, supra note 12.
123. Ibid. see s. 2(2) definition of "Automated transaction" and s. 2(6) definition of
"Electronic agent." The Reporter's Notes in the July, 1998 Draft indicate that this Act favours
the use of the term electronic agent over the term electronic device (which had been used in
previous drafts). The motivation behind this change is based largely on the desire for
uniformity with UCC-2B (precursor to the UCITA), as well as the recognition that the term
electronic agent has become a "near term of art."
124. UETA, s. 13, Reporter's Notes at para. 3, supra note 12.
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tion of electronic agents or the interaction of an electronic agent and an
individual.125 In addition to enabling electronic agents to contract, the
section provides a mechanism for click-through transactions. Part of its
effect is to validate online transactions, such as where a consumer effects
a purchase by interacting with an electronic agent on a commercial Web
site. It will likely also affect other informational transactions, such as
agreements in which one party enables another to use information
contained on a Web site for personal purposes in exchange for a promise
to agree to the Web site owner's terms and conditions. 26
Despite a recognition that electronic devices can operate autono-
mously and can enter into contracts without human oversight, the
operations of such devices are still treated in UETA as nothing more than
the extensions of human action. According to s. 9(b), "[t]he effect of an
electronic record or electronic signature attributed to a person ... is
determined from the context and surrounding circumstances at the time
of its creation, execution, or adoption, including the parties' agreement,
if any, and otherwise as provided by law." '127
Two other provisions in the UETA are involved in its attribution
process. S. 9(a) has the effect of attributing an electronic record or
electronic signature to a person when that record or signature resulted
from the operations of his or her electronic agent. This section is an
elegant version of art. 13 of the Model Law. In addition to attributing the
operations of electronic agents to the persons utilizing them, s. 9(a)
highlights the important role to be played by security procedures in the
electronic environment. It allows the act of a person to be shown in any
manner, "including a showing of the efficacy of any security procedure
applied to determine the person to which the electronic record or
electronic signature was attributable." '28 Not surprisingly, reliable au-
thentication mechanisms will become necessary as electronic agents are
used more and more to create electronic records and electronic signa-
tures.
One further similarity between s. 9 UETA and art. 13 of the Model Law
is that neither provides for the possibility that an autonomous electronic
agent might operate in a manner unknown, unforeseen or unauthorized by
the person who initiated its use. Currently, both provisions would
attribute liability to the person who initiated the electronic agent even if
125. UETA, s. 14, supra note 12.
126. For example, a promise not to use the information for certain prohibited purposes.
127. UETA, s. 9(b), supra note 12.
128. UETA, supra note 12 (emphasis added).
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it malfunctioned or performed operations unintended by the person on
whose behalf it was operating. This is highly problematic and will be
further addressed below in Parts V and VI.
The final relevant provision in the UETA is s. 10. Although this section
deals primarily with the legal effect of changes or errors in an electronic
record, subsection (2) contains a special provision for mistakes that occur
in the contract formation process as between an individual and an
electronic agent.
10(2) In an automated transaction involving an individual, the indi-
vidual may avoid the effect of an electronic record that resulted
from an error by the individual made in dealing with the
electronic agent of another person if the electronic agent did not
provide an opportunity for the prevention or correction of the
error and, at the time the individual learns of the error, the
individual:
(A) promptly notifies the other person of the error and that
the individual did not intend to be bound by the elec-
tronic record received by the other person;
(B) takes reasonable steps; including steps that conform to
the other person's reasonable instructions, to return to
the other person or, if instructed by the other person, to
destroy the consideration received, if any, as a result of
the erroneous electronic record; and
(C) has not used or received the benefit or value of the
consideration, if any, received from the other person. 129
Such a provision is premised on a recognition that the process of
automation may generate a number of unexpected results in the form of
keystroke errors and other human mistakes. This provision is therefore
necessary to make up for the fact that, in an automated transaction, it will
not always be possible for an individual to communicate to the electronic
agent after the fact that he or she had not meant to enter into the
transaction. The section seeks to accomplish these things without other-
wise disturbing the law of mistake. In fact, s. 10(3) specifically refers to
the substantive law and indicates that it applies, as always, with the
exception of the circumstances contemplated in subs. (1)13° and (2). The
section also seeks to provide an incentive for the implementation of error
correction mechanisms.
129. Ibid. s. 10 (emphasis added).
130. Subsection (1) applies when the parties have agreed to use a security procedure but one
of the parties has not conformed to the procedure.
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In the context of consumer purchases, s. 10(2) is an important provi-
sion. According to it, an individual will be precluded from avoiding a
transaction on the basis of a mistake in situations where the electronic
agent has provided an opportunity for the individual to prevent or correct
the error. Although this seems fair enough, it is sure to create a disadvan-
tage for the average consumer who has by now become accustomed to
clicking-through a Web site rapidly and without carefully inspecting its
terms and conditions. Such consumers are likely to click "yes" on the
"Are you sure?" screen long before giving pause to consider whether they
had made any mistakes along the way.
The focus of s. 10(2) is solely on human errors in automated transac-
tions. However, in addition to situations where an individual transmits an
offer or an acceptance by accident, it is also possible that an electronic
agent might malfunction or, even more likely, function properly though
unpredictably to transmit an offer or acceptance that was unintended,
unforseen or unauthorized by the person on whose behalf the electronic
agent was operating. It is important to note that nothing in this provision
or in any other section of UETA contemplates this possibility. Aside from
its potential to yield unjust results, the failure to include electronically
generated mistakes in this section might provide a disincentive to
merchants in electronic commerce, who would be hesitant to utilize
autonomous agent technology if that technology is given an unlimited
power to bind them, regardless of the circumstances of the transaction.
c. The Proposed Uniform Electronic Commerce Act"'
Though the UECA was designed to implement the principles underlying
the Model Law in Canada, its scope extends beyond electronic commerce.
UECA also contemplates a number of other legal relationships that rely
on documentation, e.g., the transaction of information between individu-
als and government. In order to facilitate the resolution of disputes
relating to the formation of contracts or, more generally, disagreements
about when an informational transaction is said to have taken place, Part
2 of the proposed UECA sets out default rules for the communication of
documents. Among other things, Part 2 contemplates the communication
of information by means of an electronic document or by electronic
interactions, such as clicking on an appropriately designated icon on a
computer screen.'32 Part 2 also contemplates automated communications
131. UECA, supra note 13.
132. See section 20 UECA, supra note 13.
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accomplished through the use of electronic agents. S. 19 defines an
electronic agent as "a computer program or any electronic means used to
initiate an action or respond to an electronic documents [sic] or actions
[sic] in whole or in part without review by a natural person at the time of
the response or action."' 3 3 S. 21 provides that, "[a] contract may be
formed by the interaction of an electronic agent and a natural person or
by the interaction of electronic agents." 3 4
The Canadian approach is elegant in that it avoids the need for a
distinct attribution rule. Rather than attributing the operations of the
electronic agent to the acts of its human or corporate initiator, the UECA
simply permits contracts to be performed by the interaction of electronic
agents. Although the provision does not expressly contemplate the
possibility that an electronic agent might operate more like an interme-
diary than an instrument, s. 21 is drafted in a manner that is sufficiently
flexible to accommodate such a possibility.
S. 22 of the UECA contains an error provision that renders certain
transactions between a natural person and an electronic agent of no legal
effect. The error provision is practically identical to UETA section 10 (2)
discussed above. If a natural person makes a material error'35 while
transacting with an electronic agent but notifies the other person of the
error as soon as practicable and takes reasonable steps in responding to
instructions concerning the return (or destruction) of the consideration
prior to receiving any material benefit, the transaction will be unenforce-
able. The section applies only if the electronic agent did not provide a
method of preventing or correcting the error. As the annotation to this
section indicates, "[t]his provision gives online merchants a way of
giving themselves a good deal of security against allegations of mistake,
and encourages good business practices in everybody's interests."' 3 6
Like s. 10(2) of the UETA, the mistake provision in s. 21 of the UECA
restricts its focus to mistakes made by a person while interacting with an
electronic agent. With the aim of producing straightforward legislation,
the drafters of the UECA chose to avoid altogether the difficult issue of
mistakes generated by electronic agents. The failure to address this issue
is sure to become problematic for the very reasons articulated above in the
analysis of s. 10(2) UETA.
133. UECA, supra note 13.
134. UECA, supra note 13.
135. E.g., clicks "Yes" when she meant "No", or ordered "10,000,000" units of product
instead of "10".
136. UECA, supra note 13.
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d. The Proposed Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act'37
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) and the American Law Institute have been working for
several years on a set of coherent legal standards to support electronic
transactions. Originally, it was thought that the proposed legislation
would be incorporated into the Uniform Commercial Code as art. 2B.
However, on 7 April 1999 it was announced that the NCCUSL would
promulgate legal rules regarding computer information transactions as a
separate act entitled Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
(UCITA). Like the Model Law, UETA and UECA, UCITA is being created
in response to the tremendous growth in the information industry. It too
is intended to address the need for uniformity and clarity in the online
environment. The act purports to deal with three issues of contract law
that apply to electronic commerce: (1) the authentication of electronic
records, (2) the manifestation of assent, and (3) the attribution of
electronic messages. The newly proposed draft was presented at the
meeting of the NCCUSL in Denver, Colorado in July 1999. It was
adopted in principle and is now is subject to revision by the NCCUSL
Committee on Style. UCITA has been targeted for enactment in all fifty
states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
Like the Model Law and UETA, the UCITA deems the operations of
electronic agents as an extension of human action. According to the
Reporter's Notes (that accompanied the former UCC-2B), "[p]arties who
employ electronic agents are ordinarily bound by the results of their
operations."'' 31 However, on 2 June 1999 a newly revised version of the
UCITA was released which includes a number of modifications to this
general rule.
In spite of the Reporter's Note that electronic agents are not fully
equivalent to the common law notion of an agent, UCITA does define
computer programs that operate independent of human review as "elec-
tronic agents."' 3 9 The definition of "electronic agent" and "automated
transaction"'140 are not all that different here from those of UETA. UCITA
does add some sophistication by considering the fact that the contract law
notion of "conspicuous terms" will have a particular meaning in the
context of automated transactions.'
4
'
137. UCITA, supra note 14.
138. This statement can still be found in UCITA, s.102, Reporter's Notes at para.18, supra
note 14.
139. Ibid. s. 102(27), supra note 14.
140. Ibid. s. 102(7), supra note 14.
141. Ibid. s. 102, supra note 14. "Conspicuous" is defined in paragraph (14). A conspicuous
term, with regard to an electronic agent, will include a term displayed or placed in such a way
that the agent cannot proceed without taking some action with respect to that term.
Spirits in the Material World: Intelligent Agents as Intermediaries in Electronic Commerce 229
S. 202 contains a general provision on contract formation which
validates transactions entered into by electronic agents. The language
contained in subs. (a) is somewhat different than the language found in
the Model Law and UETA. It implies that a contract will be formed
through the operations of electronic agents only if the transaction dem-
onstrates the existence of an agreement between the parties using the
electronic agents. This requirement is effective and important. It furthers
the objective of creating a media neutral environment while, at the same
time, harmonizes electronic commerce with the traditional approach to
contract formation.
S. 213(a) of the newly released UCITA is perhaps the most important
provision relevant to this study. It prescribes the circumstances under
which an electronic event will be attributed to a person. Though the first
sentence in subs. (a) is generally meant to parallel art. 13 of the Model Law
and s. 9 of the UETA, it contains a major addition. The provision now
attributes the operations of an electronic agent to the person using it where
he or she is otherwise "bound by it under the law of agency or other
law .
142
As will be discussed below in Part V, some of the principles of agency
law are well-suited to operate in conjunction with an attribution rule and
should be used in electronic commerce legislation. However, there are
several respects in which the provision in s. 213 is problematic. First, it
is not clear that a person would be otherwise "bound by [an electronic
agent] under the law of agency." The doctrinal difficulties enumerated in
Part II preclude the possibility of invoking the law of agency without an
additional deeming provision that would make it applicable to electronic
agents. The above provision does no such thing. Second, s. 213(a) fails
to articulate the relevant principles of agency to be applied in electronic
commerce. What of the rules in agency dealing with the relationship
between agent and principal or between agent and third party? Can
agency law be invoked to the effect that duties are owed to the electronic
agent by the person using it or vice versa? And what about the possibility
of duties owed by an electronic agent to the third party? By referring to
the law of agency without articulating which aspects of it are said to be
relevant, the above provision confuses the law of electronic commerce
rather than clarifies it.
142. UCITA, s. 213(a), supra note 14.
230 The Dalhousie Law Journal
The rest of s. 213 pertains to the rules surrounding an attribution
procedure chosen by the parties themselves. Many of these rules are
similar to the UCITA predecessor and to the other proposed statutes
discussed above.
UCITA s. 107 sets out the conditions under which a person will be
bound by the operations of an electronic agent. It is important because it
specifically contemplates the possibility of autonomous electronic agents
by stipulating "even if no individual was aware of or reviewed the agent's
operations or the results of the operations." '143 It enumerates three uses of
electronic agents in electronic commerce. First, electronic agents can be
used to authenticate records either by electronically signing documents
on a person's behalf or otherwise. Second, an electronic agent can be used
to perform certain contractual duties. If the transaction involves an
exchange of information, or information in exchange for something else,
there are circumstances in which an electronic agent can perform some
or all of the obligations undertaken by the person for whom it is operating.
For example, a Web-based music provider can employ an electronic
agent in conjunction with MP3 technology to fill orders without human
oversight or intervention.'I" Third, in addition to authenticating records
and performing contractual duties, electronic agents can be used to
manifest a person's assent. Although it is presently nonsensical to say that
an electronic agent has the capacity to consent to contract, it makes
perfect sense to say that an electronic agent can be used to manifest the
assent of the person using it.
UCITA goes further than any of the other proposed legislation by
defining the contractual notion of a "manifestation of assent" in the
context of electronic commerce. S. 112 stipulates that an electronic agent
manifests assent on behalf of the person using it if, "after having an
opportunity to review" 14 a record or term, the electronic agent authen-
ticates it or "engages in operations that the circumstances indicate
constitute acceptance."'' 4 6 This provision seeks to make it clear that the
143. UCITA, s. 107(d), supra note 14.
144. H.D. Rafter et al., "Streaming into the Future: Music and Video on the Internet" in
Patent, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series (New York:
Practising Law Institute, 1999) at 547; N.A. Bloom, "Protecting: Copyright Owners of Digital
Music - No More Free Access to Cybertunes" (1998) 45 Journal of the Copyright Society of
the USA. 179; R. Harris, "Consumer Friendly Music Technology Threatens Industry Profits"
Nando Times (Dec. 11, 1998) online: Nando Media <http://www.techserver.comnewsroom/
ntn/info/121 198/info6 2962 noframes.html> (last modified: 11 December 1998); J. Alder-
man, "Composing Music's Future Form" Wired (July 2, 1998), online: Wired <http://
www.wired.com/news/news/culture/story/13444.html> (last modified: 11 June 1999).
145. UCITA, s. 112(b), supra note 14.
146. Ibid. s. 112(b)(2).
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manifestation of assent requires circumstances that constitute a person's
acceptance of an offer. 4 7 The section would be improved if it more
clearly indicated that the manifestation of a person's assent is sometimes
made through an electronic agent, though never by an electronic agent.
Thus the statutory language "electronic agent manifests assent" ought to
be rewritten. After all, the whole point of the provision is to indicate that
an electronic agent can be used by a person to manifest his or her assent.
Besides improving the language, such a change would allow for contrac-
tual liability to be limited to only those'instances in which a person
intended to manifest assent through the electronic agent. This would
justly accommodate situations in which an electronic agent's manifesta-
tion of some person's assent is unreliable.
Like UETA, UCITA also recognizes that electronic commerce is likely
to generate errors that will not be immediately detected by electronic
agents. It therefore contains a similar attribution procedure for the
detection of changes and errors.148 Unlike s. 10 of the UETA cited above,
UCITA s. 214 applies only in the case of consumer transactions. Still, it
will not permit a consumer to avoid an automated transaction merely
because he has changed his mind. Although the section appears to
contemplate "errors created by a consumer using an information process-
ing system", it fails to provide a mechanism that would allow the party
using an electronic agent to avoid transactions where a machine gener-
ated error has occurred.
Fortunately, such a mechanism is contemplated in UCITA s. 206. This
section states that a contract may be formed by the interaction of
electronic agents and that the contract's existence is indicated when
performance commences but not if "the operations resulted from fraud,
electronic mistake or the like."' 49 A provision that contains a mechanism
for limiting contractual liability in the case of computer generated
mistakes is extremely important, yet this seems to be the only proposed
legislation that addresses the issue. Unfortunately, the term "electronic
mistake" is nowhere defined.
147. Presumably, there is no reason to think that the manifestation of assent could refer to an
offer as well.
148. Like the UETA, if the parties have adopted a commercially reasonable attribution
procedure, the provision operates against the nonconforming party. See UCITA, s. 214, supra
note 13. "Attribution procedure" is defined in paragraph 102(5) as a "procedure to verify that
an electronic authentication, display, message, record or performance is that of a specific
person or to detect changes or errors in the information. The term includes a procedure that
requires the use of algorithms or other codes, identifying words or numbers, encryption,
callback or other acknowledgment." "Commercial reasonableness" is described in section 212.
149. UCITA, s. 206(a), supra note 14. The rest of section 206 serves to prevent a human being
from altering or vitiating a contract by engaging in conduct to which the electronic agent cannot
react.
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S. I1I provides an additional safeguard. S. 1 11 (a) stipulates that when
a contract or term is found, by a court, to be unconscionable, the court can
refuse to enforce the contract, or excise the term, or limit the terms
application in order to avoid an unconscionable result.5 0 According to
the Official Comments, "the unconscionability doctrine may invalidate
a term of the contract because of a procedural breakdown in the auto-
mated contracting process that produces unexpected and oppressive
results in the term of the agreement."'' Although this section provides
a useful safety valve, it is not clear why breakdowns in the automation
process would lead to "unconscionable" transactions, as that term is
traditionally used.
e. Other Relevant Proposed and Enacted Legislation
Several other jurisdictions have either proposed or enacted legislation
that deals with the use of electronic devices in electronic commerce. 52
Singapore's Electronic Transactions Act'53 contains a number of rel-
evant sections, many of which are borrowed from and are therefore
similar to the various provisions of the Model Law, UETA and UCITA
cited above. 54 Recently, the Commission of the European Communities
has put forth its own Proposal for a European Parliament and Council
Directive On Certain Legal Aspects Of Electronic Commerce In The
Internal Market. I" Its intention is to put in place a legal framework by
2000. Recognizing that, "the particular acts performed by parties with a
view to concluding electronic contracts may result in considerable legal
uncertainty as to the conclusion of electronic contracts," the Proposal
contains an article which deals with the treatment of electronic contracts.
Art. 9 requires that Member States ensure "that their legislation allows
contracts to be concluded electronically.' 56 Such a provision is in
150. UCITA, supra note 14.
151. UCITA, s. 111, Official Comments at para. 3, supra note 14.
152. E.g., Singapore's ETA and Australia's ETB, supra note 103. For more information
regarding recent initiatives see "Summary of Electronic Commerce and Digital Signature
Legislation", online: McBride Baker & Coles <http://www.mbc.com/ecommerce.html> (last
modified: 8 June 1999); "Digital Signature Law Survey", online: Simone van der Hof <http:/
/cwis.kub.nl/-frw/people/hof/DS-lawsu.htm> (last modified: May 1999); "What's New",
online: Internet Law and Policy Forum <http://www.ilpf.org/> (last modified: 9 June 1999).
153. ETA, supra note 103.
154. Section 2 provides relevant definitions, section 13 prescribes an attribution rule, section
18 provides a series of presumptions relating to secure records and signatures, and paragraph
6 of section 13 addresses transmission errors.
155. EC, Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive On Certain Legal
Aspects Of Electronic Commerce In The Internal Market, COM (1998) 586 final [hereinafter
Proposal], online: Commission of the European Communities <http://www.ispo.cec.be/
ecommerce/docs/enWord6.doc> (last modified: 18 November 1998).
156. Ibid.
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keeping with the approach adopted in the proposed legislation discussed
above. Though the details remain to be worked out, the "Executive
Summary" accompanying the Proposal states that "Member States will
• ..not prevent the use of certain electronic systems as intelligent
electronic agents. ".57
The last example of legislation to be discussed in this Part is Australia's
Electronic Transactions Act 1999.158 The ETA was prepared by the
Attorney General's Department of Australia on the basis of recommen-
dations from its Electronic Commerce Expert Group, as part of the
Australian government's strategic framework on electronic commerce.
Though based on the Model Law, the ETA contains several important
exceptions. Like many of the other legislative materials cited above, the
ETA sets out default rules which parties can alter by way of contract.
Although the ETA contains no specific mention of electronic agents, it
creates a unique attribution rule based on the agency law notion of
"authority." It is unclear whether the words "or with the authority of the
purported sender" found in s. 15(1) of the ETA159 include electronic
communications sent by an electronic agent. Part of the difficulty with
interpreting this provision is that it does not contain any express language
such as, "or by an information system programmed by, or on behalf of,
the originator to operate automatically." In fact, it is important to note that
the "Explanatory Paper" indicates that such language contained in the
parallel section of the Model Law'6° was specifically rejected by the
Electronic Commerce Expert Group. 161
If s. 15(1) is indeed meant to include electronic communications sent
by electronic agents, the attribution rule in the ETA is radically different
from the approach adopted in all of the proposed or enacted legislation
discussed thus far with the exception of the most recent version of UCITA.
If electronic agents are meant to be included, s. 15(1) would require that
the relevant question to be asked in a particular case is whether an
electronic agent had the authority to operate on behalf of the purported
sender. If this is correct, the Australian approach, like the most recent
version of UCITA, takes the electronic agent metaphor seriously. That is,
it imports aspects of the law of agency into electronic commerce. What
makes this different from the attribution rules of most of the other proposed
or enacted legislation is that, in Australia, the operations of an electronic
157. Ibid. Annex at c. 1 s. 3 art. 9.
158. ETB, supra note 103.
159. ETB, supra note 103.
160. I.e., Model Law, art. 13, supra note 10.
161. ETB, supra note 103. Unfortunately, the "Explanatory Paper" does not indicate why
Model Law, Article 13 was rejected in favour of the current provision.
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agent will not always be attributed to the person using the electronic
agent. The common law concept of authority will act as a limiting
principle. Assuming that s. 15(1) of the Australian ETA was meant to
include electronic agents, the purported sender will not be liable in
situations where an electronic agent has exceeded its authority. This is an
extremely creative strategy and one that will be further explored in Part V.
It is important to note that s. 213 of UCITA will not necessarily achieve
the same effect. S. 213(a) of UCITA refers to agency law only to the extent
that agency law might be applicable to attribute the operations of an
electronic agent to the person using it. Nowhere in UCITA are agency
principles referred to or utilized as a mechanism for setting limits on the
contractual liability of the person using an electronic agent. The agency
concept of "authority" is not specifically mentioned, as it is in the ETA.
2. The Rationale Underlying the Attribution Rules
As mentioned previously, it has been said that the attribution rules
discussed above involve the adoption of a legal fiction. Generally, one
pretends that anything issuing from the computer really issues from its
human controller. 162 One might therefore ask: Why pretend? Is there no
rationale underlying these attribution rules?
One need not pretend. There is a rationale. It is perhaps best understood
as a simple extension of the widely accepted contract principle stated in
L'Estrange v. Graucob: a person who signs a contract without reading it
is normally bound by its terms. 163 Of course, this principle is itself based
on a more fundamental principle in the law of contract, namely, the notion
of reliance. As Atiyah once put it in the context of signed but unread
contracts:
The truth is (a party) is bound not so much because of what he intends but
because of what he does.... The man who signs a written contract is liable
because of what he does rather than what he intends. And he is liable
because what he does for the good reason that other parties are likely to rely
upon what he does in ways which are reasonable and even necessary by the
standards of our society.164
By analogy, those who operate devices that have the ability to create
reliance in the minds of others ought to be bound by the agreements
generated by the devices - whether or not those agreements were
specifically intended. If an electronic agent authenticates a record,
162. See Allen & Widdison, supra note 9 at 43. For a general discussion of legal fictions, see
I.R. Kerr, supra note 104.
163. [1934] 2 K.B. 394.
164. See P. Atiyah, Essays on Contract, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1986) c. 2. See
also R. Samek, "The Objective Theory of Contract and the Rule in L'Estrange v. Graucob"
(1974) 52 Can. Bar. Rev. 351.
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manifests (a person's) assent, commences or promises performance, the
result will be that a reliance interest is created in the person on the
receiving end. Admittedly, the analogy loses some of its initial plausibil-
ity when one contemplates transactions between two electronic devices.
In what sense could an electronic device be said to rely on the agreement
in situations where no human was ever aware of the particular transac-
tion?
Still, there is some merit in this approach. By holding liable the person
using an electronic agent for what it does rather than what he or she
intends, the risk of producing unpredicted obligations is placed on the
person who is best able to control that risk. If the risks are allocated in this
manner, a strong incentive is provided to those who use electronic agents
to ensure that they are properly programmed and frequently moni-
tored. 165 There is, however, a certain danger inherent in attributing each
and every computer communication to the human or corporate operator
of the electronic device. For example, the liability for an unintended
transaction might in some circumstances be more appropriately attrib-
uted to the developer of the electronic device rather than to its user. This
is so in cases where the device malfunctions. 66
One can also imagine situations in which a transaction or series of
transactions initiated by an electronic device are not the result of a
malfunction but were nonetheless unintended and perhaps even unfore-
seen by its operator. As contemplated above in Part I, once electronic
agents become more intelligent, their use in non-consumer, commercial
enterprise is bound to develop. Instead of employing small programs
limited to individual elements of business activity such as information
search agents, inventory tracking, customer support or book-keeping,
single integrated agents will preside over multiple functions. For in-
stance, in a manufacturing business, a "super-agent" might monitor the
in-house stocks of manufacturing supplies, keep track of the rate of
consumption, determine the need for new supplies, communicate with a
number of suppliers, and be responsible for the bidding, contracting and
ordering of those supplies.
Because of its multiple functions, such a system would have to contain
some form of decision making capacity which would include a program
that prioritizes its various functions. A system such as this could be
165. See Allen & Widdison, supra note 9 at 51.
166. Since the third party with whom the electronic device has transacted is not privy to any
contract that might exist between the developer of the electronic device and the person using
it, such liability would not be contractual in nature. For a general discussion of tort liability in
this context, see J. J. Fossett, "The Development of Negligence in Computer Law" (1987) 14
N. Ky. L. Rev. 289; G.S. Takach, Computer Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 1998) 288-304.
236 The Dalhousie Law Journal
sufficiently complex so as to make it difficult if not impossible for the
average user to predict how the super-agent would resolve a particular
series of conflicts in a given set of circumstances. As supplies dwindled,
the need to bid for new supplies might become more urgent, something
that might be programmed as an element of the software's bidding style.
At the same time, however, the super-agent might have been programmed
to include as a priority the limiting of in-house stocks to conserve
warehouse resources. Further priorities might include keeping the rate of
factory consumption at a certain level, the preference of certain suppliers
over others, and so on.
An incredibly complex balancing act would follow, and any given
outcome would depend on the way in which the priority structure is
assigned to the super-agent. It is inevitable that such a program, if
sufficiently complex, will occasionally make decisions that are perfectly
logical though completely unintended by its users. Certain combinations
of priorities might lead the software agent to form contracts that would
never have been anticipated by its principal. Given the complexity of the
demands made upon the machine, this is bound to happen as easily with
mechanized employees as with human ones. What should happen in such
a situation if an unintended offer is quickly snapped-up by some third
party who is completely aware of the fact that the person using the device
would never have consented to any such transaction? If the law simply
attributes the communication initiated by the electronic device to its
operator without in any way accounting for the intermediary events
initiated by the electronic device, the result will surely be unjust since the
failure to recognize the intermediation will render inapplicable equitable
relief that would have otherwise been available via the law of contract. 167
Recall, as well, that the error provisions in each of the proposed statutes
(except UCITA) did not apply to persons using an electronic agent.
The success of the approach articulated in most of the proposed and
enacted statutes considered above will therefore depend on the adoption
of a flexible principle that can operate in conjunction with the attribution
rules. The role of such a principle would be to set limits on the contractual
liability of persons using electronic agents so that people will not
necessarily be signing their lives away simply by choosing to initiate
devices that have the potential to generate transactions that were unin-
tended, unforseen or unauthorized. Without some sort of limiting prin-
167. Because of the attribution rule, the person using the device will not be said to have been
mistaken. Only if the device was recognized as an intermediary would the law of mistake
apply.
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ciple, electronic agents will have an unlimited power to bind those who
use them. Not only is this unjust, it is impractical. Strict or even absolute
liability simply will not foster the growth of electronic commerce.
V. Curing Doctrinal Difficulties by Treating Electronic
Devices As Agents
The general approaches examined in Parts III and IV (with the possible
exception of the recent UCITA and the ETA) appear to turn on a
dichotomy: either we treat autonomous electronic devices as independent
legal persons or else we treat the operations of those devices as the
extended acts of the persons using them. It should be pointed out that this
is a false dichotomy. One need not catapult from one extreme to the other.
The choice not to treat electronic devices as independent legal persons
does not entail a singular rule which attributes every transaction gener-
ated by an electronic device to the person who initiated its use. As
discussed above, the use of an electronic device as an intermediary is sure
to result in some transactions that are unintended, unforeseen or unautho-
rized by the person using it. Consequently, in certain circumstances, it
might be unjust to attribute those transactions to that person. How, then,
should we treat electronic devices, recognizing that they sometimes
operate more like intermediaries than instruments?
1. The Electronic Slave Metaphor
It is worth keeping in mind that the problem of intermediaries in
commercial transactions is by no means novel. To take an ancient
example, the Romans dealt with similar difficulties in the context of
slavery law. In fact, there is a certain similarity in the legal status of
Roman slaves and that of autonomous electronic devices.168 Like autono-
mous electronic devices, Roman slaves possessed valuable skills and
could independently perform various important commercial tasks upon
command. Still, Roman slaves were not recognized as legal persons
according to the ius civile.169
Although they were not considered to be legal persons and therefore
lacked the power to invoke the law for their own protection, Roman slaves
were not treated merely as chattels either.170 There were a number of legal
168. See Wein, supra at note 81 at 110- 111.
169. Institutiones lustiniani 2. 14. 2.; 3. 17. pr.; Novellae Theodosius 17. 1. 2.: quasi nec
personam habentes. See also W.W. Buckland, The Roman Law of Slavery (New York: AMS
Press, 1962) at 2-5.
170. As was generally the case with slaves in the southern United States. "Slaves, from their
nature, are chattels, and were put in the hands of executors... declaring them to be personal
estate ": Walson 's Ex'r v. Payne, Fall T., 1794; Wash. Rep., 1.8.; Hawkins Adm 'r. v. Craig, 6
Monroe's Rep. 254. See generally B. Hollander, Slavery in America: Its Legal History
(London: Bowes & Bowes, 1962).
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rules that made it possible for slaves to participate in commerce in a
meaningful way, sometimes even with the power to alter the legal
positions of Roman citizens. For example, Roman slaves were permitted
to enter into contracts."'7 Given that slaves in Rome were without rights,
such contracts could only be enforced through their masters. Still, this
meant that a slave could enter into a contract and thereby bind a third party
on his master's behalf. It is worth noting that the slave's power to bind
both parties was asymmetrical. According to Roman law, a master would
be bound to the third party only if the master had given his slave prior
authority to enter into the contract on his behalf.'72 This meant that a
Roman citizen who wished to contract with another Roman citizen
through the instrumentality of the other's slave had to be careful to make
sure that the other citizen actually held a similar intent. If that other citizen
had not expressly authorized the deal made by his slave, that other citizen
could escape liability. Notice the effect of this rule. It allowed cunning
citizens (or at least those who were unafraid of sharp practice) to build an
escape clause into slave-made contracts. By sending slaves out to make
contracts without authorizing any of the particulars, citizens could bind
third parties without binding themselves. The effect of such a rule is
obviously unfair to third parties. Although there is no evidence that this
was a well established practice, this example illustrates the kind of
complexities that can arise once intermediaries are allowed to take part
in business transactions. It also illustrates the kind of rule that should be
avoided.
In order to protect the various parties to a transaction involving slaves
as intermediaries, Roman commercial law ultimately became honey-
combed with a number of legal fictions, i.e., ad hoc formulas through
which exceptions could be generated without threatening the existence of
the general rule that allowed slaves to act as intermediaries in contractual
transactions. 73 Despite the challenge that such a system would offer to
legal taxonomists at that time and ever since, one thing is certainly clear:
"Roman commerce was mainly in the hands of slaves.' 74
171. Institutiones lustiniani, Tit. XVII De Stipulatione Servorum; Institutiones lustiniani, D.
xlv. 1. 130; See also Hadley, Introduction to Roman Law, In Twelve Academical Lectures (New
York: D. Appleton and Company, 1873) at 114.
172. Digesta lustiniani 4.4. 3. 11, 23.; See also Buckland, supra note 169 at 158.
173. See Buckland, supra note 169, c. 6-9; R. Sohm, The Institutes: A Textbook of the History
and System of Roman Private Law (New York: Augustus M. Kelly, 1970), Part II: The System
of Roman Private Law, Book I: The Law of Persons, c.1, ss. 32 (Slavery). For a general
discussion of the historical development of legal fictions, see I.R. Kerr, c. 1, supra note 104.
174. For example, a slave might carry on a bank, with or without orders, the master's rights
varying according as it was or was not with thepeculium: Digesta lustiniani 2.13.4.3.; A slave
might be a member of a firm: Digesta lustiniani 17. 2. 63. 2.; See Buckland, supra note 169
at 131.
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If predictions turn out to be accurate and electronic commerce falls
mainly in the hands of intelligent agent technology, the electronic slave
metaphor could turn out to be more instructive than typical metaphors
used to describe intelligent agent technology such as the "personal digital
assistant."'75 Although they are not presently considered to have the
status of person in law, if the promise of this technology is fulfilled and
these devices begin to display high levels of autonomy and intelligence
then there might be good reason to treat these devices more like interme-
diaries rather than as mere instruments. The aim of doing so is not to
confer rights or duties upon those devices. Rather it is simply the first step
in the development of a more sophisticated and appropriate legal mecha-
nism that would allow persons interacting through an intermediary to be
absolved of liability under certain circumstances. To this extent, the
Roman law of slavery offers a valuable lesson to legislators who are
considering how best to treat autonomous electronic devices. Instead of
viewing the alternatives as a dichotomy - either we attribute legal
personality to electronic devices or else we impose strict liability on those
who initiate their use - the electronic slave metaphor reveals a third
option. As in ancient Rome, the legislators of electronic commerce might
decide that it is appropriate to enact a special set of rules that define the
parameters of liability for those who choose to conduct commerce
through the use of intermediaries, recognizing that the acts of an interme-
diary are not always identical to those contemplated by the person
initiating the use of that intermediary. To this end, it is useful to consider
certain principles of the modern law of agency.
2. The Electronic Agent Metaphor
Following in the footsteps of the law of master and servant, the modern
law of agency also "recognizes that a person need not always do things
that change his legal relations himself: he may utilise the services of
another to change them, or to do something during the course of which
they may be changed." '176 In the law of agency, an intermediary has the
power to affect the legal relations of the person who has authorized the
intermediary to act on his behalf. The original expression of this idea is
founded upon the Roman law formula: quifacitper aliumfacitper se (he
who acts through another acts himself). Interestingly, this Roman fiction
bears some similarity to the general attribution rule contemplated by the
Model Law, the proposed UETA, UECA and UCITA. Its formula is one
of identity: the agent's acts are the acts of the principal.
175. See P. Maes, supra, note 3.
176. F.M.B. Reynolds, Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency, 16th ed. (London: Sweet and
Maxwell, 1996) at 3.
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Of course, our modem law of agency is much more sophisticated and
subtle. Agency law has developed a number of discrete principles for
dealing with complex transactions involving intermediaries. For ex-
ample, a person can give her agent a general authority so that he can act
on her behalf according to his own discretion. This could result in
circumstances where the person who granted authority to the agent (the
principal) is unaware of the fact that she has entered into particular
commercial transactions. Still, the law of agency will impose limits on the
acts performed by her agent. Only in certain circumstances are the acts of
the agent deemed to have the same legal effect as if they were acts
performed by the principal. But before investigating the relevant agency
principles, it is important to recognize that agency law by itself would be
insufficient to cure the doctrinal difficulties enumerated above in Part II,
since agency law applies only to legal persons. In order to invoke the
principles of agency law it is therefore necessary to include electronic
devices within the set of rules that form the external aspect of agency. 17
A provision that would deem an electronic device to be an agent for the
purposes of electronic commerce would not be altogether farfetched.
After all, it is a well established principle in the law of agency that one
need not have the capacity to contract for oneself in order to be competent
to contract as an agent.
For example, an infant.., even though incompetent to be a principal in
respect of a particular contract, may none the less act as an agent in the
making of such a contract. It is irrelevant to his capacity to act as an agent
that, because of his infancy, he may not be liable to the third party on the
contract, where an adult agent would have been personally liable.178
Likewise, courts have held that corporations which are not legally
capable of carrying on a particular type of business (e.g., insurance) might
still act as the agent of a principal who is licensed to carry on in such a
business. 79 As Bowstead and others have pointed out, "[T]he rationale
of this seems to be that the agent is a mere instrument and that it is the
principal who bears the risk of inadequate representation."'' ° Although
177. The external aspects of agency are discussed in the text surrounding note 183.
178. G.H.L. Fridman, Fridman's Law ofAgency, 6th ed. (London: Butterworths, 1990) at 50-
51. See also Smally v. Smally (1700), 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 6,283; Re D'Angibau (1880), 15 Ch. D.
228 at 246.
179. Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Dewitt (1974), 40 D.L.R. (3d) 113.
180. Reynolds, supra note 176 at 41. See also Mijller-Freienfels, "Law of Agency" (1957)
6 Am. J. Comp. L. 165 at 180-81; Norwich andPeterborough B.S. v. Steed, [1993] Ch. 116 at
128.
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this statement is clearly hyperbolic,"8t it suggests an important contrac-
tual point. When a principal authorizes an agent to contract on her behalf,
the relevant contractual intent belongs in fact to the principal and not her
agent. Where the principal has expressly authorized a transaction, her
agent is, legally speaking, the instrument through which the principal's
contractual intent is expressed. Consequently, the agent's capacity and
intent are superfluous to the transaction, so long as the agent is able to
manifest the principal's assent to contract.'82 As Bowstead put it:
The basic justification for the agent's power as so far explained seems to
be the idea of a unilateral manifestation by the principal of willingness to
have his legal position changed by the agent .... There is certainly no
conceptual reason which requires a contract between principal and agent
to achieve this creation of power, and it is indeed clear that no contract is
necessary, for a person without juristic capacity may be an agent. Further,
if only the relations between principal and third party are in issue, it may
not be necessary for the agent to have agreed to, or perhaps even to have
knowledge of, the conferring of authority at all, if it can be established that
the principal had conferred it; though such a situation would be an unusual
one. 183
Although Bowstead clearly did not have electronic commerce in mind
when he wrote this passage, electronic devices comport well with the
scenario envisioned. Since disputes in electronic commerce will involve
only the relations between principal and third party, there is no need for
the 'agent"'8 (i.e., the electronic device) to have agreed to or to have
knowledge of the conferring of authority at all. So long as it can be
established that the 'principal' (i.e., the person initiating the electronic
device) did confer 'authority' in one way or other, the 'agency' relation-
ship will be established and the 'principal' will be bound by the opera-
tions of the electronic 'agent'. Although, as Bowstead acknowledges, it
would be unusual for an agent not to have agreed to or not to have known
about the conferral of authority in situations where the agent has juristic
capacity, the same cannot be said of 'agent' mediated electronic com-
merce.
Having established a credible basis for the electronic agent metaphor,
it is important to determine which of the various principles of agency law
are relevant to electronic commerce.
181. Given that agents have rights and obligations, and given that the concept of"authority"sets
limits on the potential liability of a principal, it is hyperbole to say that the agent is merely an
instrument and that the principal bears all of the risk associated with inadequate representation.
182. Assuming, of course, that the principal has contractual capacity.
183. Reynolds, supra note 176 at 3-4 (emphasis added).
184. For the sake of clarity, italics and 'single quotation marks' are meant to indicate
unconventional uses of the terms agent, principal, authority, agency, etc. in the context of
electronic commerce.
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3. Relevant Principles in the Law of Agency
Agency law is sometimes characterized as having an internal and an
external aspect.
The external aspect is that under which the agent has the powers to affect
the principal's legal position in relation to third parties. The internal aspect
is the relationship between principal and agent, which imposes on the
agent (subject to contract) special duties vis- -vis the principal, appropri-
ate to the powers which he can exercise on the principal's behalf.85
Obviously, given that electronic devices are not presently the subject
of rights or duties, only the external aspects of agency law are relevant to
electronic commerce. In other words, the only aspects of agency law
relevant to electronic commerce are those that pertain to the relationship
between the person who initiates an electronic device and third parties
who transact with that person through the device.
86
a. Authority
As Fridman has stated, "[t]he question of the authority of an agent is at
the very core of agency. It is complex and difficult, but it must be
understood, if the nature of agency is to be comprehended."'' 87 One might
begin by thinking of authority as a special kind of legal power held by an
agent, a power to perform some act which affects the principal's legal
relations. In cases where that power is voluntarily conferred by the
principal to her agent, the agent is said to be "authorized" or to "have the
authority" to act on the principal's behalf.'88 Although consent is the
paradigmatic mechanism by which authority is conferred, in some cases
an agent will obtain the power to affect the principal's legal relations
withouther consent. In such cases, the agency relationship is not the result
of the unilateral manifestation by the principal of a willingness to have his
legal position changed by the agent. Rather, it is the result of the
application of the common law principle of estoppel. Fridman character-
izes the application of estoppel as follows.
[A] person who by words or conduct has allowed another to appear to the
outside world to be his agent, with the result that third parties deal with him
as his agent, cannot afterwards repudiate this apparent agency if to do so
would cause injury to third parties; he is treated as being in the same
position as if he had in fact authorised the agent to act in the way he has
done."9
185. Reynolds, supra note 176 at 8.
186. Keeping in mind the fact that such a transaction might be further complicated by the use
of an electronic device on the other end as well.
187. Fridman, supra note 178 at 15.
188. See Reynolds, supra note 176 at 6.
189. Fridman, supra note 178 at 99.
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The fact that authority can in some instances be conferred in the absence
of a manifestation of consent demonstrates that the agency relationship
results as an operation of law. Authority that is the result of a principal's
consent is often referred to as "actual authority," whereas authority said
to result from an operation of law, in this case the rule of estoppel, is often
referred to as "apparent authority" (sometimes "ostensible authority").
Applying the first of these two types of authority to the electronic
commerce scenario, the person initiating an electronic device might
voluntarily confer a power by the unilateral manifestation of a willing-
ness to have her legal position changed through the operations of the
electronic device. This power shift would allow the operations of an
electronic device to alter the legal position of that person. As is the case
with infants and corporations under certain circumstances, it matters not
that the device lacks the juristic capacity to perform certain acts. 90 All
that matters is that the person initiating the device had in fact consented
to the operations performed by that device. If a willingness to have her
legal position changed through the operations of the electronic device has
been made manifest or is implied by the circumstances, one might say that
the device has an actual authority to operate on behalf of the person who
initiated its use.
The second type of authority can also be applied to the electronic
commerce scenario. In some instances, the person initiating an electronic
device will make things appear to the outside world as though the
electronic device is operating under her authority. In situations where a
representation is made which makes it appear as though a person has
initiated an electronic device to operate on her behalf and another person
relies on the representation in a manner that results in the alteration of his
position, the person initiating the device effectively confers a power
which allows the device to alter her legal position. On the basis of the
estoppel principle, this is true even if that person has not voluntarily
conferred a power to the device. To describe this process in the language
of agency, one might say that the device has an apparent authority to act
the behalf of the person who initiated its use.
The authority concept, as applied to electronic commerce, can be used
to set limits on the liability of persons utilizing electronic devices. In other
words, authority can be used in conjunction with an attribution rule to set
parameters that will help to determine when a person is liable for
transactions generated by her electronic devices and when she is not.
Essentially, a person will not be liable for the transactions generated by
190. Reynolds, supra note 176 at 166-67.
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her electronic device where the operations of that device have exceeded
her consent. Likewise, she will not be liable in situations where the
operations of the device did not result in representations that allowed it
to appear to the outside world as though the device was operating on her
behalf.
Since electronic devices are programmed (for the moment, at least), it
is safe to say that there will be no occasions in electronic commerce where
the authority of an agent is conferred in such ambiguous terms or where
the instructions are so uncertain as to be capable of more than one
construction. Consequently there is no need, in electronic commerce, to
determine whether an electronic 'agent' is said to have acted "reason-
ably" or "in good faith."'1 9' However, as the technology becomes more
refined, one might expect issues to arise in the context of whether an
electronic 'agent' has operated in excess of its implied actual authority
when it functioned in a particular manner so as to execute the instructions
of the person who initiated its use. For example, assume that an electronic
'agent' is 'authorized' to buy certain shares. If so, the device would also
have the 'implied authority' to operate within the scope of that which is
necessary in the usual course of business to complete the transaction. 192
Is the 'agent' authorized to open a line of credit in order to pay for the
shares? What if the 'agent 'arranged the line of credit through an
illegitimate lender? Given that intelligent devices might one day soon 'do
business' in a completely unpredictable and unconventional manner, the
scope of that which is "necessary in the usual course of business to
complete the transaction" might undergo a radical shift. Part of the
problem, as highlighted above in Part I, is that the operations of these
devices will not always be dictated by those who program them. The
electronic devices of tomorrow will 'learn for themselves' what is
necessary in the usual course of business to complete the transaction.
Another authority issue that could become problematic is whether and
when an electronic device may delegate its 'authority' to another device
and, if so, to what extent is the person who initiated the original device
responsible for the operations of the device to which a task was delegated.
As discussed above in Part I, the technologies of tomorrow will likely
incorporate collaborative electronic devices that operate in a collabora-
tive manner across an open, interoperable platform. It is quite likely that
when people 'authorize' devices to undertake complex transactions, they
will do so without knowing that those devices will delegate portions of the
191. That is, the internal aspects of the agency relationship (i.e., the relationship between the
principal and agent) are not relevant to electronic commerce.
192. This example is in part borrowed from Reynolds, supra note 176 at 118.
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task at hand to other devices. 'Sub-agency' problems could arise if those
other devices engage in transactions that are not sufficiently related to the
task as conceived by the person who initiated the original device.
b. Ratification
In cases where an electronic device is said to enter into 'unauthorized'
transactions with some third party, it is possible that the person who
initiated the device might later affirm its operations notwithstanding the
want of authority. In such instances, it will be important to determine
whether the traditional agency principle known as "ratification" applies
and, if so, under what circumstances. Ratification has been defined in the
American Restatement as,
The affirmation by a person of a prior act which did not bind him but which
was done or professedly done on his account whereby the act, as to some
or all persons, is given effect as if originally authorised by him. 93
Some authors have referred to ratification as "subsequent authority."'9 4
By this it is meant that the doctrine of ratification makes it possible in
certain circumstances for authority to be conferred ex post facto.I5
Where a principal is said to have ratified the acts of his agent, he will be
bound by those acts, as if it had been antecedently authorized, "whether
it be for his detriment or his advantage.' ' 96 However, the doctrine of
ratification can be invoked only under certain circumstances. According
to Bowstead,
The only person who has the power to ratify an act is the person in whose
name or on whose behalf the act purported to be done, and it is necessary
that he should have been in existence at the time when the act was done,
and competent at that time and at the time of ratification to be the principal
of the person doing the act; but it is not necessary that at the time the act
was done he was known, either personally or by name to the third party.'97
The doctrine of ratification aims to complete the relationship between
a principal and third party by seeking to accomplish what both parties had
actually intended.198 In the case of electronic commerce, the third party's
intentions are satisfied in the sense that she or he had always intended to
contract with the person in whose name the device purported to be
operating. Likewise - notwithstanding the fact that the device in question
'exceeded its authority' - the 'principal" s ultimate intentions are also
193. Restatement (Second) Agency §82 (1957).
194. See, e.g., S.J. Stotjar, The Law of Agency (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1961) at 177.
195. See, e.g., B.S. Markesinis & R.J.C. Munday, An Outline of the Law ofAgency, 3rd ed.,
(London: Butterworths, 1992) at 67.
196. Per Tindal CJ in Wilson v. Tumman (1843), 6 Man & G 236 at 242.
197. Reynolds, supra note 176, art. 15 at 71.
198. Markesnis & Munday, supra note 195 at 68.
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satisfied through the doctrine, though not until the moment of ratification.
It is important to underscore the fact that, in order to satisfy the actual
intentions of the parties, the doctrine of ratification will only apply in
situations where a third party is contracting with a device that is purport-
edly operating on behalf of some 'principal'. It will not apply in situations
where the third party is unaware of the existence of a person who initiated
the device.
c. Disclosed and Undisclosed Principals
By requiring third parties to know that the intermediary is purporting to
transact on another's behalf, the law of agency is said to distinguish
between disclosed and undisclosed principals. A disclosed principal is
one whose interest in the transaction as principal is known to the third
party at the time of the transaction in question.'9 9 An undisclosed
principal is one whose existence is not known to the third party at the time
of the transaction. 200 When a third party contracts with an agent who is
acting for some undisclosed principal, the third party will, by definition,
do so under the mistaken impression that he is in fact contracting with the
agent alone. Mistakenly, the third party believes that the agent is the
principal.
The third party's mistaken impression is theoretically unproblematic
in situations where the agent is authorized to transact on the undisclosed
principal's behalf. Where the undisclosed principal has authorized the
agent to act, the law will treat the agent as though he or she is the principal.
The same cannot be said, however, when the agent of an undisclosed
principal acts in excess of his or her authority. In such a case, if the
principal is undisclosed, it will not be possible for that principal to invoke
the doctrine of ratification. Since the third party was unaware of the
existence of the real principal, the third party cannot be said to have
intended to contract with that person. Because the third party did not have
the requisite contractual intent vis- -vis the undisclosed principal, the
two parties were never ad idem. Consequently, the undisclosed principal
will be precluded from ratifying an unauthorized transaction entered into
by his or her agent.
The rule that precludes undisclosed principals from ratifying unautho-
rized transactions could have a useful application in electronic com-
merce. It could indirectly encourage those who initiate a device to make
conspicuous the fact that the third party is transacting with a device and
not a person. In other words, the 'principal' will come to recognize it as
199. Reynolds, supra note 176 at 30.
200. Ibid.
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a good business practice to disclose the fact the she is transacting through
an electronic 'agent' so that she will not be precluded from enforcing
agreements made by the 'agent'. If such a business practice does become
accepted and the standard use of electronic devices is conspicuous rather
than transparent, this will without a doubt result in fewer mistaken
transactions in electronic commerce. To take a simple example, if a third
party knows full well that he is ordering certain goods through an
electronic device, the third party will be less inclined to attempt counter-
offers or other sorts of negotiations that one might reasonably attempt if
dealing with a human being at the other end; the third party will likely be
aware of the fact that the device might not be able to 'read' or 'under-
stand' certain kinds ofresponses.01 In essence, the application of the rule
that precludes undisclosed principals from ratifying unauthorized trans-
actions would seek to ensure that the 'principal' and 'third party' have in
fact reached a consensus ad idem, as is required by the law of contract.
Conclusion
One of the central themes expressed throughout this article is that the
devices that automate electronic commerce will soon be able to animate
it. These devices will cease being mere conduits of communication. They
will soon begin to look and feel more like intermediaries than like
instruments. And as they do, it will become more and more difficult to
determine how the law should treat them.
The temptation amongst academics, lawyers and legislators alike is to
treat this problem as turning upon a dichotomy. Accordingly, electronic
devices are either legal beings or they are nothing. Either they possess
rights and owe duties or else they have no independent legal power
whatsoever. The reason some have adopted this dichotomy is that, if it
were anything but either of these two extremes, allowing those devices to
function in electronic commerce would interfere with our doctrinal
understanding of the law of contract. Such an interference, it is thought,
is not to be tolerated since the success of electronic commerce will depend
on its ability to comport with established ways of doing business.
In this article it has been suggested that such reasoning exemplifies a
false dichotomy. If it is true that the legal ontology of an electronic device
falls somewhere in between that of a piece of office equipment and a
living business person, this causes no new problem for the law. Our law
can and does accommodate for intermediaries in a transaction, even
where those intermediaries are said to lack thejuristic capacity to contract
201. Or, at least, his awareness of this possibility might make it unreasonable for him to rely
on such attempts.
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for themselves. Consequently, an absolute attribution rule that considers
the operations of an electronic device to be the acts of the person using it
is not the only option that follows from a recommendation against
deeming such devices to be independent persons.
Situating these rather conceptual points within the context of the
proposed electronic commerce regimes, the question becomes one of
limitation. If it is incorrect or unjust always to attribute the operations of
an intermediary to the person who employs it, what mechanism is most
properly suited for carving out the appropriate bounds of contractual
liability? The proposed statutory buzz words are "the manifestation of
assent." Indeed, this sounds like good, solid contract doctrine. The
problem is that, in the context of agent mediated electronic commerce,
this phrase turns out to be a misnomer. Although the phrase is meant to
signify the requirement of an assent by the person who is a party to the
agreement, in the case of electronic commerce, it is the electronic device
operating on his or her behalf that usually does the manifesting. In fact,
it is contemplated that persons using electronic agents will often be
unaware that any such transaction has taken place. As is the case with
human intermediaries, when an electronic agent makes manifest some-
thing other than what the person using it would have manifested had she
or he reviewed the proposed transaction, it is unclear whether it can truly
be said that there has been a "manifestation of assent." If it were a person
and not a device playing the role of intermediary, the law of agency would
require that we look either to the intentions of the principal or else to the
representations made by the principal to the third party to see whether
there was indeed a manifestation of assent. But, according to the majority
of proposed electronic commerce regimes, we need not bother with any
such investigation in the case of agent mediated electronic commerce.
The proposed attribution rules generally provide that anything made
manifest by an electronic agent will be attributed to the person using it.
It is suggested that such a rule is too removed from traditional common
law principles and would not promote or foster the development of
electronic commerce.
Consequently, drafters of any new legislation should carefully con-
sider the way that our law treats other intermediaries. It is suggested that
the law of intermediaries is a promising place in which to find the
appropriate set of limiting principles to accompany an attribution rule of
the sort found in the proposed and enacted legislation. Although the
devices of intelligent agent technology might not yet appear to be
sufficiently "intelligent" to require an application of the law of interme-
diaries, the promise of agent technology will likely make an application
of the law of intermediaries necessary in the near future. An application
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of the external aspects of agency law would furnish a useful set of limiting
principles which could operate in conjunction with fundamental prin-
ciples of contract law to help determine whether there has in fact been a
"manifestation of assent" in particular electronic transactions.
